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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by PhishDestroy on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[My Dog vs. Elite Lawyers, Part 4: Dr. Patrick, Your Own Document Just Destroyed Your Client.]]></title>
            <link>https://phishdestroy.medium.com/my-dog-vs-elite-lawyers-part-4-dr-patrick-your-own-document-just-destroyed-your-client-7d0d2b3708ae?source=rss-98b99bd0b2cb------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[data-breach]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[steam]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[osint]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[PhishDestroy]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 12 Sep 2026 15:33:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-12T15:33:17.150Z</atom:updated>
            <cc:license>https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/</cc:license>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xXe6w9wU_g5g0ksuGRXmWA.png" /><figcaption><em>830 pages. 312 “Suspected Hijacker” entries. Seven years of stolen items. And a PDF that selected what to hide.</em></figcaption></figure><p><em>Parts 1–3 established the breach: Taylor Wessing sent 830 pages of fake-redacted Steam user data to the subject of their own legal threat — black rectangles over fully readable text. Pfizer. SAP. Chubb’s Cyber Incident Response Team. Same Aspose.PDF 20.8 pipeline. Dr. Patrick Zurheide then GDPR-erased his own name from Google. Called a data breach notification involving children “amusing.” The dog is 3–0.</em></p><ul><li><a href="https://phishdestroy.medium.com/my-dog-vs-elite-gdpr-lawyers-the-valve-data-breach-nobody-is-talking-about-f6f7683d813d">My Dog vs. Elite GDPR Lawyers: The Valve Data Breach Nobody is Talking About</a></li><li><a href="https://phishdestroy.medium.com/my-dog-vs-elite-lawyers-part-2-the-5-year-pdf-vulnerability-exposing-global-corporations-81cdad269253">My Dog vs. Elite Lawyers (Part 2): The 5-Year PDF Vulnerability Exposing Global Corporations</a></li><li><a href="https://phishdestroy.medium.com/my-dog-vs-elite-lawyers-3-valve-gdpr-and-the-cover-up-dd003307e309">My Dog vs. Elite Lawyers 3: Valve, GDPR, and the Cover-Up </a></li></ul><p><em>Now Dr. Patrick has produced his star witness. It is himself.</em></p><h3>🚨 Key Findings</h3><blockquote><strong>Valve maintains a field called “Suspected Hijacker.”</strong> It is a native category in Valve’s own data export — produced under legal compulsion, signed by Dr. Patrick Zurheide under qualified electronic signature, filed through the German judicial beA system. On the account covered by this disclosure, it is populated <strong>312 times.</strong></blockquote><blockquote><strong>Valve told victims for seven years it could not identify attackers.</strong> The same legal correspondence describes Valve tracking a device that simultaneously logged into dozens of stolen Steam accounts across multiple years. The support script and the legal letter cannot both be true. Taylor Wessing chose to file both.</blockquote><blockquote><strong>Web sessions never expired. By design.</strong> Attackers read private messages, regenerated API keys, and substituted trade offers indefinitely — because Valve set web session lifetime to “never.” Valve expires gameplay sessions routinely. It chose not to expire the sessions controlling users’ tradable assets.</blockquote><blockquote><strong>The stolen items are still there. Still hidden.</strong> When Valve bans a bot account, stolen items are frozen and the inventory concealed from public view. Not one item has ever been returned to any victim. Valve keeps them.</blockquote><blockquote><strong>The attack ran from 2018 to July 2025. Seven years and four months. Five interventions. Four failed.</strong></blockquote><blockquote><strong>Some rows in the 830-page document were correctly redacted. Others were not.</strong> Taylor Wessing can redact a PDF — the document proves it. What remained readable was not selected by accident.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*vxjpfIptfYO51fgM6gEOrw.png" /><figcaption>Suspected Hijacker — 312 entries</figcaption></figure><h3>The Field Names Sent To The Subject Of Their Own Legal Threat</h3><p>The Article 15 data export — produced by Valve under legal compulsion and transmitted by Taylor Wessing to the subject of the GDPR request — contains these native field names from Valve’s own systems:</p><pre>Time Login (UTC)<br>Time Logoff (UTC)<br>Location<br>Type<br>HardwareID<br>Suspected Hijacker        ← 312 entries. On one account.<br>SteamID / Relationship / Time of Relationship (UTC)<br>Abuse Reporter Account Name / Report Type / Description / Time of Report</pre><p><strong>“Suspected Hijacker”</strong> is not an inference. It is not something we are reading into the data. It is a field Valve named, maintains, and populates. Transmitted under legal obligation of accuracy and completeness. Over a qualified electronic signature.</p><p>Valve has had a “Suspected Hijacker” classification throughout the entire period during which victims were told:</p><blockquote>“We cannot identify suspicious activity on your account.”</blockquote><p>The field was there. It was populated. The capability existed. The choice was made not to use it to protect users — only to ban accounts and freeze their contents.</p><h3>The Sentence That Ends The Argument</h3><p>Dr. Patrick Zurheide, Taylor Wessing Hamburg, 1 October 2025. Signed. Filed through beA:</p><blockquote>“Over a period of several years, between 2019 and 2023, this user account was used principally from a device which at the same time was also used to log in to dozens of stolen Steam user accounts.”</blockquote><p>To produce that sentence, Valve must:</p><ul><li>Record a persistent hardware identifier per session</li><li>Retain it across multiple years</li><li>Cluster unrelated accounts by shared device identifier across the entire platform</li><li>Identify which of those accounts were stolen</li><li>Perform the analysis retrospectively, on demand, years after the events</li></ul><p>That is precisely the capability whose absence has been the stated reason for refusing restitution to every victim who ever contacted Steam Support.</p><p>Dr. Patrick’s own filing proves it exists and has existed throughout.</p><p>For seven years, Steam Support told victims: <em>“We cannot determine who operated your account.”</em></p><p>For seven years, Valve was clustering accounts by device identifier, populating a “Suspected Hijacker” field, and logging every session with hardware fingerprint, IP address, and exact timestamp.</p><p>Both positions cannot be true.</p><p>Either Valve can attribute sessions to devices and cluster accounts — in which case restitution was refused while Valve held data identifying the actor.</p><p>Or it cannot — in which case its ban decisions are unsupported by the evidence it claims to hold.</p><p><strong>Dr. Patrick, which is it? You filed proof of both.</strong></p><h3>What Valve’s Systems Actually Collect</h3><p>Not a privacy policy. The actual fields confirmed by the actual document:</p><p><strong>Per session logged:</strong> Exact login and logoff timestamp. IP address with city, region, and country. Session type — Steam Client or Web/Mobile. Hardware device fingerprint.</p><p><strong>Per account:</strong> Creation timestamp. Last login. Last logoff. Total spend in USD. Email address. Country. Full display name history with timestamps of every change.</p><p><strong>Per complaint received:</strong> Reporter identifier. Timestamp. Category. Full text of the complaint.</p><p><strong>Cross-account:</strong> Device clustering across the entire platform. One device touching dozens of unrelated accounts — logged, retained, queryable on demand, years later.</p><p>This is the system whose outsourced support staff — including teams in Russia with access to private message history, authentication records, and session durations — type the following into your ticket before closing it:</p><blockquote>“Technical limitations prevent us from verifying what occurred.”</blockquote><h3>The Web Session. Never Expired. A Choice.</h3><p>Valve expires gameplay sessions routinely. Concurrent login — terminated. Network change — terminated. Client state change — terminated.</p><p>The web session — which controlled the user’s entire tradable inventory, private messages, and API credentials — had no expiry. An attacker who obtained it retained it indefinitely. They could:</p><ul><li>Read the account holder’s private messages in real time, in parallel with the owner</li><li>Generate and regenerate Web API keys automatically — deleting the key failed because the live session recreated it instantly</li><li>Monitor all trades, chats, and activity continuously</li><li>Cancel legitimate trade offers and substitute fraudulent ones</li><li>Accept terms of service in the user’s name — creating the “authorisation” Valve cited against the victim in every refused claim</li></ul><p>The “Type” field in Valve’s own export records whether each session was a Steam Client or Web/Mobile session. The attack operated exclusively through web sessions. Valve recorded this attribute for every single session throughout the entire period — the exact attribute separating the attack path from ordinary use.</p><p>Web/Mobile sessions show HardwareID 0. No hardware fingerprint bound. Every web session capable of executing this attack is, by construction, a session Valve knows is not tied to a verified device.</p><p>That is a detection signal. It existed in Valve’s own session table. On every occasion. For seven years. Unused.</p><h3>Five Interventions. Seven Years. The One That Worked Came Last.</h3><p><strong>Late 2018 — Early 2019</strong><br>Added account age and level indicators to the mobile trade confirmation screen.<br>→ The attack continued.</p><p><strong>May 2022</strong><br>Removed cancel and decline trade endpoints from the public Web API.<br>→ Operators moved to web session hijacking via stolen browser cookies. The attack continued and intensified.</p><p><strong>3 December 2023</strong><br>Required mobile authentication to generate a Web API key.<br>→ No effect. The attack ran on keys already issued and sessions already hijacked. After this fix, a single advertising campaign by scam operators netted an estimated <strong>USD 300,000 in a few days.</strong></p><p><strong>2 October 2024</strong><br>Seven-day hold on re-trading items received in a trade.<br>→ Operators waited seven days.</p><p><strong>16 July 2025</strong><br>Trade Protection ships. The sender can reverse a completed trade within seven days, unilaterally.<br>→ <strong>The offer-substitution mechanism ceased to be viable.</strong></p><p>The fifth intervention worked. Which proves it was always possible. Valve did not lack the capability — it applied a control it already possessed to a problem it had already identified.</p><p>The interval between knowing how to stop it and stopping it is seven years and four months. During that entire interval, victims were told the losses were their own fault.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jn3sgWME8LwZ2irexL6Xsw.png" /><figcaption><strong>BANNED ACCOUNTS VAULT</strong></figcaption></figure><h3>The Items. Still There. Still Hidden.</h3><p>When Valve bans a bot account, it freezes the stolen items on it. The inventory is concealed from public view. Neither the victim nor any researcher can see what is held there.</p><p>The items are not returned. Not transferred to any authority. They remain on accounts Valve itself adjudicated as fraudulent, under Valve’s exclusive control, indefinitely.</p><p>Valve’s stated justification references item duplication concerns from 2014. Every tradable item carries a unique asset identifier. Restoration is a reassignment of an existing database record, not creation of a new item. Duplication is not a risk inherent in restoration.</p><p>The seven-day trade hold Valve itself introduced means every transferred item sits stationary, identified, and attributable for a week after every theft. The evidentiary chain for restoration exists in Valve’s live systems, in real time. Valve already made the determination — by banning the receiving account — that the transfer was fraudulent. It then withheld the consequence of its own finding.</p><p>No other custodial platform retains property it has adjudicated as stolen, conceals its location, and characterises this as an anti-fraud measure.</p><p>A bank does not keep the proceeds of a fraudulent transfer.<br>A payment processor does not keep a reversed payment.</p><p>Valve does.</p><h3>Page 8. The Sentence That Belongs In A Museum.</h3><p>Dr. Patrick Zurheide. Same document. Same signature. Same date:</p><blockquote>“Eine genauere Auskunft ist aufgrund des Schutzes der personenbezogenen Daten anderer Nutzer der Steam-Plattform nicht möglich.”</blockquote><blockquote>“More detailed disclosure is not possible in order to protect the personal data of other Steam users.”</blockquote><p>This sentence appears in the same document transmitted with 830 pages of those users’ personal data — readable under black vector shapes — to the subject of Taylor Wessing’s own criminal prosecution threat.</p><p>The complaint section of that document contains personal identifiers, contact details, and links to private personal files belonging to the Steam users who filed reports against this account. Some of those users are children. Steam operates no effective age verification. Children use the platform. Their data enters Valve’s systems, is accessed by outsourced support teams in multiple countries, and was transmitted by Taylor Wessing — in a selectively fake-redacted PDF — to a party described in the same letter as an active criminal threat.</p><p>No breach notification was filed. No user was informed. No regulator was contacted by Taylor Wessing.</p><p>Dr. Patrick’s response when notified of the breach: <em>“Amusing.”</em></p><p>He is the partner on Chubb’s Cyber Incident Response Team.</p><h3>The Dog Never Betrays. Taylor Wessing Apparently Did.</h3><p>We want to say something we cannot prove. But equally, no one can disprove it.</p><p>Some rows in the 830-page document were correctly processed. Not covered — deleted. Text actually gone. The way a competent data protection practice at a firm of Taylor Wessing’s billing rates would handle a legally sensitive disclosure.</p><p>Taylor Wessing can redact a PDF. The document proves it.</p><p>Which means what remained readable was not the product of a uniform technical failure. A broken tool fails everywhere. This did not fail everywhere. Specific sections — the sections containing the “Suspected Hijacker” field, the complaint data with children’s information, the session records that directly contradict Valve’s victim-support position — were left fully readable. Other sections were not.</p><p>Incompetence does not select. Incompetence fails uniformly.</p><p>We are left with a question we cannot answer and cannot avoid:</p><p><strong>Did someone at Taylor Wessing decide to leave it readable?</strong></p><p>We will not assert it as fact. We observe that the alternative — a selective failure that, by coincidence, exposed exactly the data that demolishes Valve’s legal position while protecting data that does not — requires an improbable coincidence to sustain.</p><p>Consider what Taylor Wessing was being paid to defend. Seven years of platform-enabled theft. 312 “Suspected Hijacker” entries on a single account. Session data proving Valve watched it happen and did not act. Children’s complaint data flowing through outsourced support operations in Russia. Stolen items frozen on banned accounts, inventories hidden, nothing returned, victims told it was their own fault.</p><p>Perhaps someone reached a limit.</p><p>The dog has never betrayed anyone. The dog has never transmitted children’s personal data to a hostile party. The dog has never selectively failed to redact the sections that expose her employer’s client to regulatory consequence.</p><p>Taylor Wessing sent the file to the subject of their own legal threat. With some rows correctly deleted. And others left exactly as they were.</p><p>Draw your own conclusion. We drew ours.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*hAAbHeX0qhzTt0sdMbAUqw.png" /><figcaption>AMUSING</figcaption></figure><blockquote>🐾 Good Boy, Dr. Patrick.</blockquote><blockquote>You threatened a GDPR requester with criminal prosecution inside the response document itself. You cited user data protection in a file leaking user data. You called a breach notification “amusing.” You GDPR-erased your own name from Google as if that would help.</blockquote><blockquote>And then you sent 830 pages containing a field called “Suspected Hijacker” — populated 312 times — to the person asking the questions.</blockquote><blockquote>Every regulator now has that sentence. Every journalist has that field name. Every affected user has the toolkit to open their own Taylor Wessing documents and check what is underneath the black rectangles.</blockquote><blockquote>You did more for this investigation than we ever could have done alone.</blockquote><blockquote>Good boy.</blockquote><blockquote>The dog approves.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ewDkUvkmEOcKF3tuw-YBIQ.png" /><figcaption><strong>THE BETRAYAL</strong></figcaption></figure><h3>October 14.</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DMC41FDBolWtoO9RVMrvQg.png" /><figcaption>We’ll talk a little bit about money, sanctions, and what Valve is doing</figcaption></figure><p>Part 2 of our full investigation publishes October 14.</p><p><em>IPFS valve.xmr|steamdestroy.eth</em></p><p><em>Since we know the “doctors” believe the right to be forgotten applies in their case, we think hosting on IPFS is a great test of how skilled they really are — or, obviously, how much they aren’t. You have an infinite amount of time, exactly as long as the valve.xmr domain remains registered, because in Part 2, I will demonstrate and prove that Valve skins are faster and more reliable than anonymous cryptocurrency.</em></p><p>We won’t say more. We don’t need to.</p><h3>The Regulatory Record</h3><p>The complaint is filed. The documents are on record. The field names are in them. The signatures are on them.</p><p>The authorities that matter have the referral under reference <strong>PD-VALVE-2026/01.</strong> We give notice of its existence. We give notice of nothing else.</p><p>Part 5 comes when they answer.</p><p>The dog is waiting.</p><p>— <strong>PhishDestroy Research Team (and the Dog)</strong></p><p><strong>Part 1</strong> <a href="https://phishdestroy.io/valve-profits-from-stolen-accounts">https://phishdestroy.io/valve-profits-from-stolen-accounts</a></p><p><strong><em>IPFS CID:</em></strong><em> bafybeiawlyqj267cdywzzmfpdqar5n6umhheijqebwqiz2xifa3pgbmupm</em></p><p>Full investigation and evidence: <strong>phishdestroy.io</strong><br>Toolkit: <strong>github.com/phishdestroy/taylor-wessing-data-breach-toolkit</strong><br>Reports: <strong>complains@phishdestroy.io</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7d0d2b3708ae" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[My Dog vs. Elite Lawyers 3: Valve, GDPR, and the Cover-Up ]]></title>
            <link>https://phishdestroy.medium.com/my-dog-vs-elite-lawyers-3-valve-gdpr-and-the-cover-up-dd003307e309?source=rss-98b99bd0b2cb------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/dd003307e309</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[gdpr]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[data-breach]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[valve]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[PhishDestroy]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 10 Sep 2026 12:10:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-10T12:10:45.791Z</atom:updated>
            <cc:license>https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/</cc:license>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>My Dog vs. Elite Lawyers, Part 3: The GDPR “Right to be Forgotten” Trap and Why Academic Papers Are Forever</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nwYGLkBVEtI6wOEtQ_tIgQ.png" /><figcaption>Why does Dr. Patrick Zurheide believe it is legal to use the name Taylor Wessing to cover up his failure?</figcaption></figure><ul><li><a href="https://phishdestroy.medium.com/my-dog-vs-elite-gdpr-lawyers-the-valve-data-breach-nobody-is-talking-about-f6f7683d813d">My Dog vs. Elite GDPR Lawyers: The Valve Data Breach Nobody is Talking About</a></li><li><a href="https://phishdestroy.medium.com/my-dog-vs-elite-lawyers-part-2-the-5-year-pdf-vulnerability-exposing-global-corporations-81cdad269253">My Dog vs. Elite Lawyers (Part 2): The 5-Year PDF Vulnerability Exposing Global Corporations</a></li></ul><p>Alright, everyone, you can exhale. There will be no “Hydra.” I was joking about flooding the internet. But I do want to extend a massive, sincere “thank you” to Dr. Patrick for exercising his GDPR “Right to be Forgotten.”</p><p>You see, invoking that right leaves a very specific, highly visible digital footprint. And let’s call it what it is: Dr. Patrick has just permanently attached a Dark Pattern to his own name.</p><p>Did you really think we were crazy enough to blindly multiply articles and attack a corporation that is actively breaking the law just to bait us? No. We came here to expose Valve, and we are exactly on the right path.</p><h3>The Google Warning: A Massive Red Flag for High-Paying Clients</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-cwBChPKtq4gfjnZMW7tSg.png" /><figcaption><em>Einige Ergebnisse wurden möglicherweise aufgrund der Bestimmungen des europäischen Datenschutzrechts entfernt. </em><a href="https://www.google.com/policies/faq"><em>Weitere Informationen</em></a></figcaption></figure><p>Let’s look at Dr. Patrick’s GDPR case from a logical standpoint. The “Right to be Forgotten” was designed to protect private, vulnerable citizens. But in this case, Dr. Patrick used his big name and legal weight to apply pressure — once again “proving” his elite professionalism and understanding of the law.</p><p>But here is where the elite lawyer made a critical error in understanding how search engines actually work.</p><p>Dr. Patrick isn’t just Googled by random people on the internet. He is Googled by <em>clients</em>. Wealthy, corporate clients looking to hire a highly expensive, top-tier lawyer. When a reasonable client is about to spend massive amounts of money, they do their due diligence. And when they scroll down his Google search results, they will now see a glaring, unremovable warning: <strong>Information has been hidden.</strong></p><p>For any intelligent client, this is an instant trigger. It screams that something is being concealed. If they care about where their money is going, they will dig deeper. And they <em>will</em> find what was hidden.</p><h3>The Dog Metaphor: Smearing the Evidence</h3><p>We might be a little crazy, and we could have easily trashed the internet with garbage to prove a point. But why? We aren’t web terrorists; we are the truth. If the truth is so unpleasant for Dr. Patrick, we are truly sorry — he could have just written to us. Instead, he and Valve continued to cover up a data breach (which exposed children’s data!) and failed to report it.</p><p>Their calculation was obvious: provoke us, wait for us to act unhinged, and then accuse us of defamation. But there is a flaw in their plan. We don’t care about their accusations, and we don’t care about Dr. Patrick’s degrees. The article is true. Are we giving up? <strong>No.</strong></p><p>Here is a simple truth: <strong>When a dog poops on the floor, it doesn’t try to hide the crime by smearing it all over the walls.</strong> It just makes the mess bigger, smellier, and impossible to ignore. Dr. Patrick, your GDPR takedown request was you smearing it on the wall.</p><h3>The Academic Strike: Good Luck Deleting This</h3><p>They expected the “Hydra” — a blind, aggressive multiplication of blog posts. Instead, we have documented a top-tier lawyer using a Dark Pattern. For any major corporation (like Google’s Security Team), this is a trigger for a deep audit. They will look into web archives, find the logs, and see exactly what Valve’s lawyers were trying to bury.</p><p>Since Dr. Patrick likes to play games with the law — acting as a private citizen when he wants to hide, but representing Valve when it suits him — we decided to change the battlefield.</p><p>This year, we will be releasing <strong>two full academic papers</strong> regarding corporate security competence and the (in)ability to handle PDF vulnerabilities.</p><p>You can DMCA a blog post. You can use GDPR to hide a Medium article. But <strong>you cannot delete academic materials.</strong> Once published in academic repositories, they are forever. And out of pure courtesy, we will make sure these papers are sent directly to Dr. Patrick’s university. Perhaps the academic community can help him and his colleagues regain their grip on reality.</p><h3>A Message, Not a Threat</h3><p>You calculated that we would be cruel and reckless. We calculated that an elite lawyer would vanity-search his own name and misuse the law to clean it up.</p><p>Dr. Patrick, stop playing games with the law. We are fully in control and we know exactly what we are doing. Do you?</p><p>We can escalate the discussion about your <em>Dark Patterns</em> to a completely different level, if you catch our drift. And no, these are not threats. Study our previous cases against other corporations. We never threaten. We just write exactly what we are going to do, and then we do it. Consider it our style of investigative journalism.</p><p>The game is still on. But we are the ones writing the rules now.</p><h3>An Open Letter to Taylor Wessing and Dr. Patrick</h3><p><strong>Dr. Tobias Schelinski </strong>D<strong>r. Patrick Zurheide</strong> and Taylor Wessing, we know exactly what you are waiting for. You are waiting for us to make a mistake, to cross a line, or to lash out blindly. But whatever you are hoping for, it will <em>never</em> justify what you are actively doing.</p><p>You are covering up a data breach involving children. You are putting kids at direct risk. A breach that <em>you</em> are responsible for. And now you are upset because someone is actually daring to talk about it?</p><p>Did you even study the law?</p><p>Dr. Patrick officially states that he represents the interests of his client, Valve. Since when does representing a multi-billion-dollar corporation make you a “private citizen” who needs the protection of the GDPR? Let’s stop playing games. You are not a victim. You are using your name and exploiting a privacy loophole to continue hiding your own legal violations, your staggering incompetence, and what essentially amounts to a corporate crime.</p><p>By handing over the data of the affected parties (the whistleblowers and victims), you effectively threw them under the bus and put them in direct danger. And after doing all of that, you genuinely believe your smartest, most reasonable move is to try and scrub the truth from the internet using the “Right to be Forgotten”?</p><p>You think you can just delete reality?</p><p><strong>We’ll see about that.</strong></p><blockquote>I don’t know what you’ve come up with over there — but you’d better not mess with us. No one’s going to pay you — and you won’t be able to take it down either. You’re breaking the law. We’re not playing games here, and this isn’t Valve trying to shield itself from the truth, which has already been partially revealed thanks to your leak. All the best, elite lawyer.</blockquote><h3>I’ll also attach this masterpiece by the “Doctor of Black Patterns” here — I absolutely love it.</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*ZmoQKPZCWl8jLspR.png" /><figcaption>Exhibit A: 830 pages of “elite” redaction. A giant black rectangle manually placed over thousands of SteamIDs, emails, and personal data points. Too bad they forgot to delete the text underneath.</figcaption></figure><p><em>If you don’t like it — and it’s true that you made a mistake — just stop Googling yourself. I can see which region Dr. Patrick was searching for Dr. Patrick from.</em></p><ul><li><a href="https://phishdestroy.io/steam-api-scam-exposed">Steam API Scam: Deception &amp; Negligence | PhishDestroy</a></li><li><a href="https://phishdestroy.io/valve-profits-from-stolen-accounts">Valve Profits from 70M+ Stolen Steam Accounts</a></li><li><a href="https://phishdestroy.io/steam-shadow-economy">Steam Shadow Economy: Pricing, Scams &amp; GDPR</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=dd003307e309" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[My Dog vs. Elite Lawyers (Part 2): The 5-Year PDF Vulnerability Exposing Global Corporations]]></title>
            <link>https://phishdestroy.medium.com/my-dog-vs-elite-lawyers-part-2-the-5-year-pdf-vulnerability-exposing-global-corporations-81cdad269253?source=rss-98b99bd0b2cb------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/81cdad269253</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[gdpr]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[data-breach]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[legaltech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[PhishDestroy]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 19 Aug 2026 11:45:20 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-20T05:09:18.298Z</atom:updated>
            <cc:license>https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/</cc:license>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote>We thought Taylor Wessing made a manual mistake with a GDPR request. We were wrong. It’s an automated, firm-wide catastrophe.</blockquote><blockquote><strong>🚨 Key Findings:</strong><br><strong>The Breach: </strong>Elite law firm Taylor Wessing is using an outdated script to “redact” sensitive PDFs, masking data visually but leaving the text fully readable underneath.<br><strong>The Scale:</strong> Evidence suggests this vulnerability has affected their corporate clients (including giants like Pfizer, Just Eat, Chubb, and SAP) since 2019.<br><strong>The Hypocrisy:</strong> While leaking massive amounts of data, their lawyers issue baseless criminal threats to citizens making lawful GDPR requests.</blockquote><p>A few days ago, as a spin-off to our massive cybersecurity exposé on <a href="https://phishdestroy.io/valve-profits-from-stolen-accounts"><strong>How Valve Profits From 70M+ Stolen Steam Accounts</strong></a>, we published an article documenting a catastrophic legal blunder.</p><p>We revealed how the elite, high-priced lawyers at <strong>Taylor Wessing</strong> (specifically Dr. Patrick Zurheide and Dr. Tobias Schelinski) accidentally leaked 830 pages of highly sensitive, de-anonymized Steam user data while trying to defend Valve against a routine GDPR request.</p><p>We joked that my dog, having precisely zero data breaches on her resume, was officially better at data protection than a Salary Partner with a PhD in IT Law.</p><p><strong>My dog is now winning 2–0.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9WYEO4v1aK12EaKqwFk7mw.png" /><figcaption>Meet our Chief Data Protection Officer. 0 data breaches. 100% better at using PDFs than Taylor Wessing.</figcaption></figure><p>After publishing the first piece, we had a long, hard think. We looked at those 830 pages of black rectangles. We realized something fundamental about corporate lawyers: they are generally too self-important to manually draw black boxes on 800+ pages. Doing that by hand would give you a severe case of digital hemorrhoids.</p><p>No, they didn’t do it manually. They used a script. And that’s when the joke stopped being funny, and became a systemic, global cybersecurity crisis.</p><h3>The Cheap Software Behind the Elite Facade</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/465/1*SZjXPsl7lPQYEIu9jeZIJA.png" /><figcaption>Forensic metadata extraction of Taylor Wessing’s 830-page response. The “36 seconds” processing time is the smoking gun: they didn’t redact manually; they used an automated, vulnerable script.</figcaption></figure><p>Here is the technical reality of what these lawyers — who think they are richer, smarter, and more important than Valve’s own users — actually did.</p><p>To save money on proper, enterprise-grade data sanitization software, their systems rely on a generic, outdated library:<strong> Aspose.PDF for .NET 20.8.</strong></p><p>The core issue is that their script uses this outdated software to draw black vector rectangles (using re/f operators in the PDF code) over text coordinates. What it should be doing is properly sanitizing and deleting the underlying text layer (using BT/ET operators).</p><p>It creates a visual mask on your screen. But the raw data? It remains 100% accessible beneath it.</p><p>Let’s do the math on the scale of this catastrophe. Dr. Patrick Zurheide alone likely processes roughly <strong>100 to 300 GDPR requests a year</strong>. For the few users who don’t immediately surrender to his initial wave of legal threats and delays, he eventually sends them the “brilliance of his experience” — a legal response document that consists of 94% black rectangles.</p><h3>But this is not Malevich’s “Black Square”.<br>It is just a cheap vector shape. Remove it.</h3><h3>The Blast Radius: Whose Data Did Taylor Wessing Process?</h3><p>We didn’t just guess that this was a firm-wide issue. We tested it.</p><p>We immediately contacted individuals we knew who had previously received documents processed by Taylor Wessing. They sent us their files. We opened them and looked straight at the meta-tags. What did we find? Exactly what we expected. The exact same vulnerability. The exact same flawed redaction script.</p><p><strong>Did we read the contents of their hidden documents? No. </strong>We absolutely refused to look at the underlying data. We simply checked the metadata, confirmed the vulnerability, and handed the owners the instructions on how to reveal the hidden text themselves.</p><p>But let’s scale this up. This vulnerability has likely been present in hidden documents processed by Taylor Wessing since 2019. Now, think about the corporate giants they defend.</p><p>Taylor Wessing proudly advertises its Data Protection and Cyber Security work for massive global corporations. Based on their own public client lists and our forensic findings, we have to ask a terrifying question regarding the data they have processed over the last five years:</p><ul><li>What about the millions of gamers in the Valve (Steam) ecosystem?</li><li>What about the global GDPR compliance documents of Just Eat?</li><li>What about the European data transfers for tech giants like Vinted and SAP?</li><li>What about the sensitive incident reports for Chubb Insurance (where Taylor Wessing ironically boasts about sitting on their “Cyber Incident Response Team”)?</li><li>And what about the highly confidential clinical data handled by Pfizer and their other Life Sciences clients?</li></ul><p>If Taylor Wessing used this same cheap script to “redact” documents for these corporations, then they didn’t hide anything. <strong>They intentionally disclosed it.</strong></p><h3>The Difference Between Us: A Message to Taylor Wessing</h3><p>Let’s address Taylor Wessing directly. What is the fundamental difference between your actions and ours?</p><p>You, Dr. Patrick and Dr. Tobias, are utterly arrogant. You threaten your clients and opponents with criminal code articles. You act like God. You arbitrarily hand out permanent account bans simply because a user’s burner email address doesn’t explicitly contain their real name. You act as the judge, the jury, and the executioner.</p><p>We do not blackmail. We do not suffer from a God complex. And we don’t just write articles. We do not decide which criminal articles apply —<strong> the courts and the regulators do.</strong> But apparently, at Taylor Wessing, you operate under the delusion that lawyers write the laws and pass the verdicts.</p><blockquote><strong>ATTENTION TO ALL CORPORATE CLIENTS:</strong> This avalanche cannot be stopped. The data is already out there. It was emailed from Taylor Wessing’s own servers. You should say a massive “thank you” to Dr. Patrick, Dr. Tobias, and their accomplices for single-handedly compromising your confidential documents.</blockquote><p>📎 SECURITY ADVISORY: We Warned Them. Now It’s Up To You.</p><p>We have already contacted Taylor Wessing and informed them of this critical vulnerability. But let’s be realistic: <strong>we know they are liars.</strong></p><p>We fully expect them to lie, hide the truth, and bury this under attorney-client privilege, because the scale of this data leak is undeniably critical. If you or your company have ever received a “redacted” PDF document from <strong>Taylor Wessing</strong>, audit these files immediately.</p><p><strong>⚡️ No-Install Lifehacks (The Easiest Ways to Check)</strong></p><p>- <strong>The “Select All” Hack:</strong> Open the PDF in your browser. Press Ctrl+A (Select All), then Ctrl+C (Copy), and paste it (Ctrl+V) into Notepad. If the redaction is fake, the “hidden” text will simply paste right along with the rest of the document.</p><p><strong>The “Blind Search” Hack:</strong> Press Ctrl+F and search for common characters (like the vowel “a” or the number “1”). If the browser registers a hit and highlights the black redaction box — the text layer is still alive.</p><p><strong>🛠 How to Check Visually (Safe Offline Software)</strong></p><p><strong>LibreOffice Draw </strong>— Open the PDF, click the black box, and press Delete.<br><strong>Adobe Acrobat Pro </strong>— Use the “Edit PDF” tool to simply drag the black shapes out of the way.</p><blockquote><strong>⚠️ WARNING:</strong> Do NOT upload sensitive legal documents to random online PDF editors like ilovepdf. You might be committing a data breach. Only use local software.</blockquote><h3>Do Not Let Them Hide This</h3><p>We are not willing to take on the burden of responsibility, nor will we act as free cybersecurity janitors to cover up the crimes of a massive law firm that exists to threaten and intimidate citizens in the interests of mega-corporations.</p><p>If you discover that your data (or your opponent’s data) was left exposed by Taylor Wessing’s fake PDF redactions, <strong>do not wait for them to contact you</strong>. They won’t.</p><blockquote>We contacted Patrick, and apparently, he thought he was the smartest guy in the room. In response to our message about the data leak, he seemed to think we were going to chat with him, and he simply called it ‘amusing.’</blockquote><blockquote>There will be no further communication between PhishDestroy and Taylor Wessing. We have notified them about the leak via their official emails. However, judging by Patrick’s reaction, ‘amusing’ means that no one is going to take any action or notify anyone.</blockquote><blockquote>Because of this, we have created a tool so you can check and report it yourselves. It can be run locally without an internet connection, and there are no logs. It works not only for this specific case but for any similar ones. Let’s just hope there aren’t any more ‘amusing’ lawyers out there besides these guys.</blockquote><p><a href="https://github.com/phishdestroy/taylor-wessing-data-breach-toolkit">GitHub - phishdestroy/taylor-wessing-data-breach-toolkit: Forensic auditing utility to expose and unmask failed visual-only PDF redactions by Taylor Wessing LLP. Designed to extract hidden text layers offline and verify GDPR compliance following the Valve Corporation data leak.</a></p><p><a href="https://phishdestroy.github.io/taylor-wessing-data-breach-toolkit/">https://phishdestroy.github.io/taylor-wessing-data-breach-toolkit/</a></p><blockquote><strong>Remove the black square, read the truth, and immediately report the data leak to your national Data Protection Regulator.</strong></blockquote><p>And if you want to share your confirmed leaks with us (<a href="mailto:complains@phishdestroy.io">complains@phishdestroy.io</a>), we will gladly forward them to the universities where these “experts” give lectures. We are certain they have nothing of value to teach students, except perhaps a masterclass in arrogance and issuing empty threats.</p><p>They will inevitably call us “black-hat hackers.” They will likely issue PR statements claiming they are “cooperating with law enforcement.” Funny, isn’t it?</p><p>Apparently, the law applies differently to them. They are the ones who leaked the data of minors. They are the ones who put children’s lives in digital and physical danger through their sheer incompetence. Yet, they operate under the delusion that they are the law.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/713/1*5sfhNZSV_uE1MhRTL72xNg.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.taylorwessing.com/en/people/germany/hamburg/patrick-vincent-zurheide">Dr. Patrick Zurheide Taylor Wessing GDPR Threat</a> Doctor, in response to a legitimate GDPR request, what are you doing? Making accusations? Did you have a fever? We guarantee that we won’t hide anything and will forward everything not just to the appropriate authorities, but to more than just the appropriate authorities — including your university. We want to challenge the fact that you’re a doctor — I think you might be a criminal? A fraudster? A blackmailer? But I’m not a court, and I’m not you — I can’t call you that.</figcaption></figure><p>They don’t hesitate to issue direct criminal threats, labeling anyone associated with a lawful GDPR request as “<strong>accomplices</strong>” (a direct formulation from Dr. Patrick Zurheide’s official response). To the corporate giants reading this: this is who you trust with your clients’ data. You are paying premium rates to absolute amateurs who treat a fundamental GDPR data request like an aggressive debt collector’s call or a hostile corporate attack.</p><p>People with this mentality have no business working in Tech and IT Law. They twist European legislation to suit their arrogance, and to make matters worse, they are allowed to teach at EU universities. With clowns like this gatekeeping data protection, EU citizens effectively have no rights. They use the very laws designed to protect you as a weapon to threaten you.</p><blockquote><strong>Let us remind Dr. Patrick and his “accomplices” of one simple fact: We do not blackmail, and we do not suffer from a God complex. We do not decide which criminal articles apply, and neither do you. The courts and the regulators do.</strong></blockquote><h4>— PhishDestroy Research Team (and the Dog)</h4><p><strong>About PhishDestroy</strong><br><strong><em>PhishDestroy </em></strong><em>is an independent cybersecurity research initiative dedicated to dismantling criminal phishing infrastructure, exposing corporate data breaches, and holding tech giants accountable for user safety. We accept no donations. We rely entirely on forensic facts.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=81cdad269253" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[My Dog vs. Elite GDPR Lawyers: The Valve Data Breach Nobody is Talking About]]></title>
            <link>https://phishdestroy.medium.com/my-dog-vs-elite-gdpr-lawyers-the-valve-data-breach-nobody-is-talking-about-f6f7683d813d?source=rss-98b99bd0b2cb------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f6f7683d813d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[gaming]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[gdpr]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[PhishDestroy]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 17 Aug 2026 23:13:30 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-18T08:18:40.173Z</atom:updated>
            <cc:license>https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/</cc:license>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A catastrophic PDF redaction failure during a routine GDPR request exposed Steam users to severe risks. Why this is no longer a joke, but a systemic failure.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*LIAp-dePhhW4FPBgpjEYkg.png" /><figcaption>Meet our new Data Protection Officer. 0 hours billed. 0 data leaks. 100% better at handling PDFs than elite corporate lawyers.</figcaption></figure><p>Let’s explore an absurd but highly practical question in the realm of corporate data privacy: Should a global tech giant like <strong>Valve Corporation</strong> hire elite attack-dog lawyers — like the ones at the international law firm <strong>Taylor Wessing</strong> — to handle standard GDPR data requests?</p><p>The answer depends entirely on your situation:</p><ul><li><strong>If your company is completely innocent and compliant: </strong>Absolutely not.</li><li><strong>If your company has a massive internal data trove to hide</strong>: Oh, yes. Hire them immediately.</li></ul><p>Why? Because these elite corporate lawyers act as unwitting double agents. They will gladly help your opponent discover every single thing you are desperately trying to hide from regulators. The only technical requirement is that your adversary knows how to open a poorly redacted PDF.</p><p>This is exactly why, in the battle for the ultimate Data Protection Officer (DPO),<strong> my dog beats a high-priced corporate lawyer hands down.</strong> A dog might chew through an ethernet cable, but it will never serve up your most sensitive corporate secrets and cause a <strong>GDPR data breach</strong> on a silver platter.</p><h4><strong>The Weaponization of Bureaucracy</strong></h4><p>The core strategy of these top-tier legal firms is to project an aura of secret knowledge, threaten the opponent straight out of the gate, and artificially stall the legal process. Does EU law require a GDPR response within 30 days? They will deliver it on day 35, ask a meaningless clarifying question, and restart the clock. The goal isn’t compliance; the goal is to exhaust the person challenging the corporation.</p><p>We have the exact timeline of this bureaucratic ping-pong. On <strong>August 15</strong>, one Taylor Wessing lawyer (<strong>Dr. Tobias Schelinski</strong>) sent a formal letter doing everything possible to stall the GDPR request. He demanded additional proof of identity, arguing that the user’s burner email address (an alias that literally translates to “<em>NotImportant</em>”) didn’t explicitly contain their real name. He then used this manufactured delay to immediately and permanently ban the Steam account in question.</p><p>They dragged this simple data request out for months. Finally, on <strong>October 1</strong>, a different lawyer (<strong>Dr. Patrick Zurheide</strong>) took over and delivered the requested data.</p><blockquote>(And yes, Taylor Wessing, we know how absolutely thrilled you must be about this article. We are so sorry for revealing your elite corporate strategy to your competitors. Wait, do you even have competitors at this level of digital incompetence? Actually, never mind, don’t answer that. We don’t have 30 days to wait for a reply from a party we couldn’t care less about.)</blockquote><p>But while weaponizing delays is a standard legal tactic, what happened next was a catastrophic operational failure. While these guard dogs were busy barking at the fence, they left the back door wide open.</p><p><strong>A Brief IT Crash Course for IT Lawyers (Module 101)</strong></p><p>Before we look at the leaked data, we need to talk about how this happened.</p><p>If you look at the syllabus for any respectable Master of Laws (LL.M.) program in IT Law, you will find extensive modules on International Data Protection, Cybersecurity Frameworks, and the legal interpretation of <strong>GDPR Article 32</strong> (“Security of processing”). Professors spend months drilling students on the theoretical necessity of securing personal data.</p><p>However, universities assume that a graduate student already knows how a computer works. They don’t teach “How to save a file” or “How to use Adobe Acrobat.” And this is where the elite corporate legal system collapsed.</p><p><strong>Here is the technical reality that escaped the experts:</strong><br>A Portable Document Format (PDF) is not a flat photograph. It is a layered digital container. When you use a basic PDF editor to draw a black vector rectangle over a line of text, <strong>you are not erasing the text</strong>. You are simply placing a digital post-it note over it.</p><p>Anyone who opens that document in a program like LibreOffice Draw, Adobe Illustrator, or even a basic text-scraping script can simply select the text layer underneath the black box, copy it, and paste it into Notepad.</p><p>Proper redaction requires “sanitization” — a process that permanently strips the text objects and metadata from the document code. Drawing a black shape is not cybersecurity; it is digital arts and crafts.</p><p><strong>The Leaked Data: When Incompetence Becomes Dangerous</strong></p><p>In response to a standard <strong>GDPR Article 15 request,</strong> Valve’s legal representation delivered a massive <strong>830-page document</strong> filled with these digital “arts and crafts.” They carefully placed black vector shapes over thousands of rows of data — leaving visible only the information convenient to their narrative (specifically, user reports filed against the requester).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*l0JTr11MnWzg3RzSLSEldA.png" /><figcaption>Exhibit A: 830 pages of “elite” redaction. A giant black rectangle manually placed over thousands of SteamIDs, emails, and personal data points. Too bad they forgot to delete the text underneath.</figcaption></figure><p>At first glance, the sheer dedication to drawing black boxes on 830 pages is almost impressive. But when you simply bypass the vectors and look at the actual data that was leaked, the humor instantly vanishes.</p><blockquote><strong>🚨 A Public Security Alert: Check Your GDPR Responses</strong><br>Through our analysis of how major corporations handle GDPR Article 15 requests, we’ve identified a systemic issue. Corporate law firms acting on behalf of tech giants often function more like aggressive PR departments or insurance adjusters. Their primary tactic is to intimidate, stall, and pressure the applicant to prevent data disclosure.</blockquote><blockquote>However, when they finally are forced to hand over the data, their technical incompetence is exposed. In an attempt to hide the personal data of third parties or internal corporate secrets, these lawyers routinely use fundamentally flawed PDF redaction methods.</blockquote><blockquote>Our urgent recommendation to all users, legal opponents, and privacy advocates:<br>If you, your colleagues, or anyone you know has ever requested data and received a PDF from these corporate lawyers with text covered by black boxes — check those files immediately.</blockquote><blockquote>Open the PDF in a basic editor (like LibreOffice Draw, Adobe Illustrator) or simply try to highlight the text under the black rectangle with your cursor and paste it into Notepad.<br>If the text copies over, a massive Data Breach has occurred.<br>Pass this information on to anyone fighting similar legal battles. Check every single document. Their intimidation tactics are a bluff, and their technical incompetence works against them — but it also compromises the privacy of countless individuals.</blockquote><h3>What the Elite Lawyers Actually Leaked:</h3><ol><li><strong>De-anonymized User Logins:</strong> Because a Steam login is often deeply personal and linked to other online identities, over 60% of the users in that document were instantly and fully identified.</li><li><strong>Unencrypted, Raw Chat Logs &amp; Absurd Reports:</strong> These weren’t just standard server logs. The document exposed a trove of absolutely unhinged, absurd user reports. We are talking about raw, unredacted messages heavily laced with extreme profanity, pure envy, and unchecked hate. It included literal death wishes, nationalistic slurs, and severe geopolitical vitriol from Russian users directed at a Ukrainian user. Instead of properly securing this highly sensitive and toxic data, the elite lawyers essentially packaged a raw database of hate speech and handed it over, completely exposed.</li><li><strong>Putting Minors at Risk</strong>: The Ukrainian user whose privacy rights Valve was trying to suppress was not a random teenager. He is an individual with serious technical capabilities. By failing to execute a basic PDF redaction, the lawyers handed him a fully de-anonymized database of the people who reported him. This placed those Steam users — many of whom are minors — in direct physical and digital danger.</li></ol><p><strong>My dog would never do this. My dog would just eat the paperwork. Zero data breach.</strong></p><h4><strong>The Masterpiece of Hypocrisy: Page 8</strong></h4><p>If you think the technical failure is funny, the official cover letter accompanying this leak elevates the situation to absolute high comedy.</p><p>On page 8 of the official legal response, <strong>Dr. Zurheide</strong> formally denies the user access to certain account details. His legal justification for withholding the information? We quote directly from the German document:</p><blockquote>“Eine genauere Auskunft ist aufgrund des Schutzes der personenbezogenen Daten anderer Nutzer der Steam-Plattform… nicht möglich.”<br><strong>(English translation: “A more detailed response is not possible due to the protection of personal data of other Steam users…”)</strong></blockquote><p>Let that sink in for a moment. The highly paid Salary Partner at Taylor Wessing explicitly refused to provide certain details in order to protect the privacy of other Steam users… in the exact same email package where he attached an 830-page PDF that completely leaked the de-anonymized identities, chat logs, and raw hate speech of those exact same users.</p><p>He proudly declared in writing that he was protecting the very data he was actively hemorrhaging.</p><p>The letter then concludes with a classic corporate intimidation tactic: threatening the user with criminal prosecution under the German Criminal Code (StGB), while simultaneously holding the rest of the user’s legally guaranteed GDPR data hostage until the user “explains” certain account behaviors to the lawyers. It is a masterclass in weaponized, yet utterly incompetent, bureaucracy.</p><h4>A 5-Star Review for “Elite” IT Law Expertise</h4><p>To understand the gravity of this failure, you have to look at who is handling this data. We are not talking about an intern.</p><p>According to public professional profiles, the individual responsible for this response is a recently promoted <strong>Salary Partner at Taylor Wessing</strong>. This is a professional who boasts a Master of Laws in International Commercial Law from the <strong>University of Aberdeen</strong> and — irony of ironies — literally completed <strong>PhD studies in IT Law.</strong></p><p>When you hire a specialist with a PhD in Information Technology Law from a top-tier international firm, you expect them to know how to properly sanitize a digital document before transmitting sensitive user data across borders.</p><p>Instead, this catastrophic failure in basic digital literacy inadvertently verified technical realities that Valve has aggressively denied for years. Thanks to this spectacular legal blunder, we now have officially documented proof that:</p><ul><li><strong>Massive Account Linking:</strong> Valve possesses the capability to link Steam accounts dating back to 2019.</li><li><strong>Deep Telemetry: </strong>Valve maintains an internal telemetry and logging system on its users that rivals state intelligence agencies in its depth.</li><li><strong>Official Confirmation</strong>: The elite legal team conveniently confirmed all of this in official, verifiable legal correspondence.</li></ul><h4>A Humble Plea to IT Law Professors (And a Reality Check)</h4><p>To the esteemed professors at the <strong>University of Aberdeen </strong>and other prestigious institutions offering degrees in IT Law: we have a humble request. Please, we beg you, push your students harder on the actual “IT” part of their degrees.</p><p>Teach them how vector graphics work. Teach them that drawing a box in Adobe Acrobat doesn’t magically erase the underlying text code. These are absolute digital basics that should be mastered before anyone is handed a PhD or allowed anywhere near sensitive <strong>GDPR user data</strong>.</p><p>But let’s be entirely fair to the academic institutions. Universities are highly authoritative and respectable entities. We know for a fact that no reputable professor teaches a student how to artificially delay a legally mandated GDPR response to exhaust a victim.</p><p>That specific skill — the weaponization of bureaucracy and the deliberate dragging out of legal timelines — is not part of any university curriculum. That is strictly an in-house corporate initiative. It’s the kind of dark art you only learn when you join a firm like Taylor Wessing.</p><p>It actually highlights a brutal, unspoken reality about the modern legal career pipeline. It seems that the graduates who truly understand technology go on to find normal, respectable jobs building, protecting, and innovating in the real world.</p><p>And the others? The ones who just want to wear the expensive suits and play with buzzwords? They go to firms like Taylor Wessing to act as high-priced corporate fixers, tasked with burying the dirty secrets of tech giants behind poorly drawn digital black boxes.</p><h3>A Formal Petition to EU Data Protection Regulators</h3><p>To the <strong>GDPR </strong>regulators and data protection authorities currently tasked with overseeing this mess: assuming your offices aren’t staffed by the exact same type of “experts,” we respectfully ask you to investigate the circus operating under the name <strong>Taylor Wessing</strong>.</p><p>Is there a legal mechanism to mandate digital re-certification for these professionals? Or perhaps someone should just check their temperatures? It genuinely seems that the moment these lawyers receive their prestigious “<strong>Dr.</strong>” prefix, they catch a severe corporate fever that permanently wipes basic computer literacy from their brains.</p><p>Do you realize the sheer volume of GDPR violations contained in this single interaction? They artificially delayed a legally mandated response, withheld data under the false guise of “protecting” others, weaponized the bureaucracy, and then <strong>accidentally leaked the raw, de-anonymized data of those exact same people.</strong></p><p>Meanwhile, let’s look at the scoreboard. My dog still has exactly zero data breaches. Sure, she didn’t successfully process the GDPR request. But she also didn’t commit a massive, cross-border data leak while billing the client hundreds of euros an hour. In the modern corporate ecosystem, doing absolutely nothing and simply not screwing up makes <strong>my dog the undisputed Employee of the Month.</strong></p><p><strong>Time to Change the Game on Steam<br></strong>This isn’t just about a lawyer making a mistake with a PDF. It is about a multi-billion dollar platform’s systemic disregard for user safety.</p><p>Our project, <strong>PhishDestroy</strong>, was born because Valve simply did not care about the unchecked spam, phishing, and hijacked accounts devouring its ecosystem. We grew in that vacuum of corporate responsibility.</p><p>Now, thanks directly to Valve’s choice of legal representation and this subsequent data leak, the curtain has been pulled back. It is time to dismantle their policy of looking the other way while children are robbed, ignoring unregulated skin gambling, and permanently freezing user inventories to pad their own bottom line.</p><p>We have compiled the evidence, the timeline of corporate absurdity, and the full technical breakdown of their failures. It is a dense, serious read, because the truth of how global corporations handle your data usually is.</p><p>👇 <strong>Read the full, extensive investigation into Valve’s practices here:</strong><br>👉 <a href="https://phishdestroy.io/valve-profits-from-stolen-accounts">PhishDestroy: How Valve Profits From Stolen Accounts</a></p><p>A Special Disclaimer for Taylor Wessing &amp; Dr. Zurheide<br>We know exactly what happens next. We know you are probably drafting a ToS complaint or a cease-and-desist letter right now to get this article taken down.</p><p>Before you do, let’s get a few things straight on the public record.</p><p><strong>First, PhishDestroy </strong>is a 100% non-profit initiative. We make exactly $0 from this. This is not a hit piece ordered by your competitors (assuming you have any at this specific level of digital arts and crafts). We are publishing this because your catastrophic leak forms the foundational evidence for our massive investigation into Valve.</p><p><strong>Second</strong>, we want to genuinely compliment your artwork. Those 830 pages of manually placed black rectangles are truly exquisite. The squares are deep, rich, and remarkably consistent. It is a beautiful testament to the fact that corporate money means absolutely nothing to the corporations spending it. Given your hourly billing rate at Taylor Wessing, this might be the most expensive modern art project in gaming history.</p><blockquote>(Pro tip for your next GDPR response: Since you are already billing Valve for hundreds of hours to draw black squares on 800+ pages, maybe try drawing some nice little circles underneath them? Just to mix it up. It won’t secure the data any better, but it will be fun for the person extracting the text).</blockquote><p><strong>Finally, consider this a polite warning:<br></strong>Any attempt to report, strike, or legally threaten this publication will be treated as a direct attack on legitimate, non-profit security research. We operate by a very simple rule of the internet. You are welcome to try and take this link down. But if you do, we will do what we always do: <strong>for every one link you destroy, five new ones will appear.</strong></p><p>Welcome to the internet.</p><blockquote><strong>A Legal Reminder for Taylor Wessing: The 72-Hour Rule</strong></blockquote><blockquote>We wouldn’t normally offer you business advice other than “close your doors,” but as cybersecurity experts, we feel obligated to point out the legal reality of your technical failure.</blockquote><blockquote>Your practice of using graphic vector overlays instead of proper structural document sanitization is a direct violation of GDPR Article 32 (Security of processing).</blockquote><blockquote>We strongly advise you to audit every single PDF you have ever sent to any opponent, applicant, or client. If you haven’t been checking these documents on a foundational IT level (stripping metadata and hidden layers), there is an extremely high probability that you are actively responsible for multiple, ongoing data leaks.</blockquote><blockquote>Furthermore, let us remind your esteemed IT Law PhDs of GDPR Article 33: Once a data controller becomes aware of a personal data breach, they are legally mandated to notify the competent supervisory authority within 72 hours.</blockquote><blockquote>Considering the cross-border nature of these leaks and the sheer volume of highly sensitive, de-anonymized data you are mishandling, attempting to sweep this under the rug will only trigger maximum regulatory penalties. You have now been made aware of the breach. The clock is ticking.</blockquote><p>👇 <strong>Once again, read the full investigation here:</strong><br>👉 <a href="https://phishdestroy.io/valve-profits-from-stolen-accounts">PhishDestroy: How Valve Profits From Stolen Accounts</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f6f7683d813d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The ICANN Cartel: $155 Million a Year for Contracts Nobody Honors]]></title>
            <link>https://phishdestroy.medium.com/the-icann-cartel-155-million-a-year-for-contracts-nobody-honors-0cddf8585088?source=rss-98b99bd0b2cb------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/0cddf8585088</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[infosec]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tech-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybercrime]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[osint]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[PhishDestroy]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 24 Jul 2026 08:28:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-07-25T11:36:48.106Z</atom:updated>
            <cc:license>https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/</cc:license>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>They want the money. They refuse outside regulation. And they do not enforce their own contracts — exactly like the registrars they accredit. The paper trail is published on ICANN’s own website.</p><pre>This small investigation points to the most likely cause: the impunity enjoyed by Namesilo (which specializes in sewer cleaning) and Mikhail Chudinov. They chose to lie and ignore our report regarding the phishing complaint, and then decided to delete our account and block our Twitter—an American domain registrar.<br>More details here: https://phishdestroy.io/namesilo-investigation/</pre><blockquote><strong>car·tel </strong>/kärˈtel/</blockquote><blockquote>An association whose members collect the market’s money, shield each other from outside oversight, and treat the rules they signed as optional.</blockquote><p><strong>They want the money.</strong> $155 million a year in fees, collected from every registry and registrar on Earth <a href="https://phishdestroy.io/icann-155-million-illusion#ref-4"><strong>[4]</strong></a>.</p><p><strong>They refuse to be regulated.</strong> No government agency audits ICANN’s enforcement. Since the 2016 IANA transition it answers only to itself — a “multistakeholder community” it convenes, feeds, and moderates.</p><p><strong>They do not honor their own contracts.</strong> The Registrar Accreditation Agreement they wrote is ignored by their own registrars — and ICANN’s response to documented breaches is a polite email thread <a href="https://phishdestroy.io/icann-155-million-illusion#ref-1"><strong>[1]</strong></a>.</p><p>The ongoing <a href="https://phishdestroy.io/trustname-evidence">Trustname</a> case proves all three at once — in documents ICANN published about itself.</p><h3>The Money: a $155 Million Toll Booth</h3><p>ICANN’s <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/financials">own financial reports</a> <a href="https://phishdestroy.io/icann-155-million-illusion#ref-4"><strong>[4]</strong></a> show what the world pays for the privilege of a functioning DNS:</p><p>$155M</p><p>Total annual revenue $91M</p><p>Registry fees $57M</p><p>Registrar fees $7M</p><p>Contributions &amp; sponsorships</p><p>For that price the global community should get stringent oversight, immediate threat mitigation, and instant revocation for accredited companies harboring criminals. What it gets instead is a cartel of inaction: people collecting “free money” for shuffling paperwork — while the crime that funds part of this ecosystem lands on victims.</p><p>And we know exactly which domains part of that fee income comes from. Our open dataset tracks ShortDot’s abuse-saturated TLD zones — ICANN’s per-domain income from them is recalculated yearly, in public, on <a href="https://github.com/phishdestroy/shortdot-evidence">GitHub</a> <a href="https://phishdestroy.io/icann-155-million-illusion#ref-10"><strong>[10]</strong></a>. Standing challenge to the “guardians of a secure internet”: show us even <strong>1%</strong> of those domains being legitimate. We looked — there is nothing legitimate there, exactly as with Trustname, and exactly as with NiceNIC, whose only notable client is DDoS-Guard — and even that is debatable. You charge a fee on every single registered domain, and you have not prevented a single scam. Analyze it. Stop lying in your reports — is that really so hard? The data is publicly available for analysis — yet it is absent from your official mitigation reports.</p><p>Look directly at the “New gTLD” program. Zones crowded with algorithmic spam, botnet C2 infrastructure and single-use phishing links — .top, .icu, .cyou and their siblings — sell for under a dollar in year one. Criminals buy them in batches of a hundred thousand, and ICANN collects its mandatory fee on every single registration. This is not a blind spot; it is a business model. High abuse volume equals high revenue.</p><p>That is the cartel’s core conflict of interest in one sentence: every registrar is a paying client and every junk registration is billable, so every revoked accreditation and every mass suspension means ICANN cutting its own income. A police force paid per criminal left on the street does not make arrests.</p><h3>Section 3.18: the Contract the Cartel Wrote and Won’t Enforce</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*nw7NxFzMu_9tnfzq.jpg" /></figure><p>Section 3.18 of the <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/approved-with-specs-2013-09-17-en">2013 Registrar Accreditation Agreement</a> <a href="https://phishdestroy.io/icann-155-million-illusion#ref-3"><strong>[3]</strong></a> obligates every accredited registrar to take “reasonable and prompt steps to investigate and respond appropriately” to abuse reports. In practice, registrars across the industry ignore it — because they know the party responsible for enforcement never enforces.</p><p><strong>A rule that is never enforced is not a rule. It is set dressing.</strong></p><p>If Section 3.18 is universally ignored and ICANN refuses to enforce it — remove Section 3.18 entirely. Keeping it manufactures a false sense of security for end-users. Without it, the world would at least see the raw, unregulated truth of the domain industry.</p><h3>The Track Record: RegisterFly, EstDomains, Epik, NameSilo</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*TSzM9CWIMdpgrRuH.jpg" /></figure><p>Trustname is not an anomaly. It is the cartel’s standard operating procedure:</p><h3>1 · RegisterFly — the meltdown that forced a reform</h3><p>In 2007, ICANN-accredited <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RegisterFly">RegisterFly</a> <a href="https://phishdestroy.io/icann-155-million-illusion#ref-5"><strong>[5]</strong></a> imploded: fraud allegations, locked-out customers, hundreds of thousands of domains expiring in captivity. ICANN spent months writing letters while registrants lost their names, and terminated the accreditation only after a public outcry — a scandal so bad it forced the RAA to be rewritten.</p><h3>2 · EstDomains — accreditation until conviction</h3><p>In 2008, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EstDomains">EstDomains</a> <a href="https://phishdestroy.io/icann-155-million-illusion#ref-6"><strong>[6]</strong></a> was the industry’s most notorious criminal registrar, servicing botnets and malware. ICANN ignored the security community for months and moved only after the CEO’s credit-card-fraud conviction became public.</p><h3>3 · Epik — breach notices while customers lost everything</h3><p>As <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epik">Epik</a> <a href="https://phishdestroy.io/icann-155-million-illusion#ref-7"><strong>[7]</strong></a> melted down — breached, insolvent, failing to renew client domains or pay registries — ICANN’s answer was boilerplate “breach notices” while users lost control of their assets.</p><h3>4 · NameSilo — a complaint answered with a vacation</h3><p>In 2018, Artists Against 419 filed compliance complaint <strong>UNY-783–11184</strong> documenting how NameSilo waved through fake registration data and ignored fraud reports <a href="https://phishdestroy.io/icann-155-million-illusion#ref-9"><strong>[9]</strong></a>. ICANN closed it with a masterpiece: the abuse “does not fall within the registrar’s purview.” The escalation was answered by a complaints officer leaving on holiday (“I am targeting 30 September to issue you a response”), then a year of “competing priorities” — and no resolution, ever. That is ICANN’s entire audit model: reports written by itself, about itself, graded by itself. Reporters are treated as idiots, registrars as saints — the same NameSilo that later covered for the <a href="https://phishdestroy.io/xmrwallet-namesilo-exposed">xmrwallet Monero-drainer</a> and <a href="https://phishdestroy.io/namesilo-investigation/">lied about it publicly on Twitter</a>.</p><h3>5 · Alpnames — revoked only after the corpse stopped moving</h3><p>ICANN-accredited Alpnames industrialized ultra-cheap new-gTLD registrations and became a global haven for spam campaigns; researchers screamed about it for years. ICANN did not terminate it over Section 3.18. The accreditation was pulled in 2019 only after the company had physically collapsed and gone dark, stranding hundreds of thousands of domains — legitimate ones included <a href="https://phishdestroy.io/icann-155-million-illusion#ref-2"><strong>[2]</strong></a>. ICANN waits for a registrar to die on its own rather than act on abuse data.</p><h3>Trustname: the Cartel Documents Itself</h3><p>The best part: none of this is a leak. ICANN voluntarily publishes the evidence of its own impotence and files it under “compliance” <a href="https://phishdestroy.io/icann-155-million-illusion#ref-2"><strong>[2]</strong></a>. The official <a href="https://www.icann.org/uploads/compliance_notice/attachment/1357/hedlund-to-nestsiarovich-16jul26.pdf">Notice of Breach of July 16, 2026</a> <a href="https://phishdestroy.io/icann-155-million-illusion#ref-1"><strong>[1]</strong></a> records, in ICANN’s own words, how a domain that was actively stealing credit card data stayed in business while the regulator wrote letters:</p><p>DateWhat ICANN’s own notice recordsJun 10<strong>First Notice.</strong> The registrar promises to fix it. The phishing continues.Jun 26<strong>Second Notice.</strong> Ignored entirely.Jul 8ICANN escalates — by email and portal message.Jul 11The registrar replies with information ICANN itself says <strong>“contradicts public data”</strong> — in plain terms, they lied.Jul 13Another follow-up email.Jul 14The registrar claims the clientHold on the card-stealing domain was removed <strong>“inadvertently.”</strong> ICANN’s response: one more email.Jul 16<strong>Third Notice of Breach</strong> — published with pride.Aug 6<strong>The deadline.</strong> A registrar that services criminal operations, lies in official correspondence and “accidentally” unblocks phishing gets three more weeks.</p><p><strong>For roughly 60 days, while criminals drain bank accounts, the cartel’s maximum sanction is being a pen-pal.</strong></p><p>Three notices. Five follow-up emails. Zero revoked accreditations. Zero protected victims.</p><h3>The WHOIS Shield and the Failure of SSAD</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*cvvRdzqXG2Ta7c_7.jpg" /></figure><p>ICANN’s complicity goes beyond inaction. After GDPR in 2018 it allowed registrars to redact WHOIS wholesale, blinding security researchers overnight. Instead of a rapid-response channel for threat intelligence, it spent years and millions designing SSAD — a bureaucratic maze in which investigators politely ask registrars for data and get ignored; the scaled-down RDRS that finally launched in 2023 is voluntary and non-binding <a href="https://phishdestroy.io/icann-155-million-illusion#ref-13"><strong>[13]</strong></a>. They built a system that protects the privacy of botnet operators better than the bank accounts of victims. Brussels drew the conclusion: Article 28 of the EU’s NIS2 directive now forces registrars by law to collect and verify accurate registrant data <a href="https://phishdestroy.io/icann-155-million-illusion#ref-12"><strong>[12]</strong></a> — a law that exists only because ICANN’s self-regulation failed. Governments no longer trust the cartel to police itself.</p><h3>Two Demands</h3><h3>1 · Publish the registrars’ responses</h3><p>Post the replies to your compliance letters — with a minute-by-minute timeline. Let the world see how accredited registrars mock you. We already hold copies of the responses they sent us; it would be illuminating to see yours. Or admit you are incapable of stopping the scams you licensed.</p><h3>2 · Answer for the fraudulent domains</h3><p>Take responsibility for the thousands of fraudulent domains sold by your accredited registrars, and account — to the last penny — for how much money real people lost while you played paper-pusher.</p><h3>A Public Statement: This Is Not Negligence. This Is Complicity.</h3><p><strong>PhishDestroy states publicly: ICANN is a co-author of most of today’s domain fraud.</strong> We know this industry from the inside — we and companies like us exist to kill the threat before the damage is done. But with a “regulator” that nobody fears, nobody respects, and that everyone knows can do nothing, it turns out the way it turns out: a large share of malicious domains simply are not suspended quickly, even by the letter of ICANN’s own agreement.</p><p>What counts as evidence? Detections by the most authoritative security vendors on the planet — Fortune-500 antivirus companies and a dozen more. The RAA does not even specify a court; in the United States there is more than one precedent of vendor detections standing as valid evidence. For any honest registrar, that standard is enough. For NiceNIC or NameSilo, hoping for a friendlier jurisdiction — that is exactly the problem.</p><p>Our public scoreboard tracks <a href="https://phishdestroy.io/registrar-accountability/"><strong>42,000 repeat abuse reports</strong></a> <a href="https://phishdestroy.io/icann-155-million-illusion#ref-11"><strong>[11]</strong></a>. A small note: since 2026, whenever a domain draws a second or third report, we add ICANN to the recipients. So let’s count together: how many of our reports did you receive — and shall we compare that number with your reports about yourselves?</p><p>And this is not just our data. Independent industry telemetry — APWG’s quarterly phishing reports <a href="https://phishdestroy.io/icann-155-million-illusion#ref-14"><strong>[14]</strong></a> and Spamhaus’s registrar and TLD reputation rankings <a href="https://phishdestroy.io/icann-155-million-illusion#ref-15"><strong>[15]</strong></a> — shows the same picture year after year: the phishing economy concentrates around a short list of ICANN-accredited registrars whose abuse desks stay silent.</p><p>And who answers for the accreditation itself? A license operated by Belarusian owners through a purchased Estonian company — issued and kept alive by ICANN, sanctions notwithstanding, as if for you they do not exist. When the victims lose their money — whose responsibility is that? Theirs, for trusting an industry whose licenses you hand to anyone?</p><p>Hundreds of millions of dollars of crypto-scam losses in the US flowed through domains serviced by NiceNIC and NameSilo and the privacy proxies they hide behind — and at least half of those domains had already been reported by security researchers before the damage was done. <strong>That is not negligence. That is complicity.</strong></p><h3>Accreditation as Immunity: the Damage That Could Have Been Avoided</h3><p>The FBI and researchers dismantle scam operations in Myanmar and beyond — while a registrar servicing a large share of those domains sits in plain sight. Its favorite tale — “we never received your reports” — is a lie, and a recurring one. Through 2023–2024, NameSilo’s auto-replies insisted it was “not the owner of the domain” and pointed at its reseller — inventing a private WHOIS hierarchy, as if the law cares how they structure the cover for global scam. Why does nobody talk about this?</p><p>Scam cannot be beaten while the entry barrier is this low. Trustname was doomed from the day it opened — but it proved something priceless about ICANN’s competence: within a day of the accreditation purchase, its DNS was already advertising bulletproof services. In practice, an ICANN accreditation turns out to be a permit — and immunity.</p><p>We have started keeping a database of <strong>avoidable damage</strong>: victims and sums lost after our notification reached the registrar. We do not have global visibility — but even the sums we can see are catastrophic, and for some victims it was everything they had. The cause is not “scammers.” It is the impunity and unaccountability of the registrar. We hope there is a competent authority somewhere in the world that will finally measure this problem — not from an ICANN report, but from something real.</p><p>The darkest irony: on underground forums, “bulletproof” domain services openly resell through ICANN-accredited channels. The “ICANN Accredited” badge now works as a quality mark for criminals — a promise that no abuse report will kill the domain quickly, unlike strict national zones such as .uk or .de where takedowns are measured in hours. ICANN sells the immunity it calls accreditation.</p><h3>Weaponizing ICANN’s Policies to Silence Security Researchers</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*GDwKWSKIBh7V7LFe.jpg" /></figure><p>To understand how deeply broken this ecosystem is, look at what happens when independent researchers expose the truth. Take the chilling case of <strong>nicenic.support</strong> — a domain created by an independent researcher to publish verified, factual intelligence about <a href="https://phishdestroy.io/nicenic-verdict">NiceNIC’s deep ties to hacker forums</a> and its role as a haven for cybercrime. Even AI systems analyzing the data began confirming the findings to the public. How did the system respond? Not by investigating NiceNIC — by crushing the researcher.</p><p>New domain which Nicenick not steal <a href="https://www.nicenic-abuse.blog/">nicenic-abuse.blog</a></p><p>When the inevitable UDRP complaint arrived to silence the site, the researcher’s registrar, Spaceship, did not merely lock the disputed domain — by the owner’s documented testimony it locked <strong>every NiceNIC-related domain in the account</strong>, freezing DNS edits on each of them, and handed the owner’s private data to WIPO without any prior notification, claiming it was “WIPO’s responsibility” to inform them. Support answered in robotic scripts, zero context, zero critical thought.</p><p><strong>The double standard, side by side.</strong></p><p>Run a research site exposing a criminal syndicate — and ICANN’s UDRP machinery is weaponized against you: your domains locked, your private data leaked to corporate entities. Be an ICANN-accredited registrar like NiceNIC — hosting millions in crypto-scams, reversing FBI domain takedowns and assisting scammers during a live $8.5 million heist from Trust Wallet users — and you face zero consequences. The system ruthlessly polices the innocent and shields the guilty.</p><h3>The Legal War Chest: an Admission of Guilt?</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*prelwJHsD3pWYnh-.jpg" /></figure><p>ICANN consistently funnels millions into its Reserve Fund, explicitly citing potential litigation <a href="https://phishdestroy.io/icann-155-million-illusion#ref-4"><strong>[4]</strong></a>. But who exactly are they preparing to fight? Certainly not non-compliant registrars — that money is never spent suing criminal networks.</p><p>They are stockpiling a legal war chest for the inevitable day of reckoning. ICANN knows its operating model is a ticking liability. What happens when Tier-1 ISPs, infrastructure giants like Cloudflare, and Fortune-500 companies finally calculate the billions they spend mitigating the malware and phishing that ICANN’s accreditation model enables?</p><p>When the industry realizes ICANN is a hollow shell — collecting taxes while outsourcing the actual security work to ISPs and security vendors — the resulting lawsuits will not be about policy. They will be about systemic negligence. ICANN is hoarding the domain market’s money to defend itself from the very industry it failed to protect.</p><h3>A Note on Infrastructure: Why Is Cloudflare Doing ICANN’s Job?</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*MlkVyw9BK3bPRAUt.jpg" /></figure><p>Let us make one thing absolutely clear: the burden of mitigating domain abuse should not fall on infrastructure providers like Cloudflare. When our systems detect a threat, we often end up sending reports to Cloudflare’s abuse team — and we are genuinely grateful that they process these appeals — simply because the ICANN-accredited registrar is either completely unresponsive or, as with Trustname, actively shielding the scam.</p><p>But let’s be objective: Cloudflare is a proxy and a CDN, not a registrar. The vast majority of these actors abuse its free tier — Cloudflare earns zero from them. It is not obligated to sort through the garbage that ICANN’s licensing system dumps onto the internet. Yet it is forced to act as the internet’s de facto janitor, because the actual regulatory body refuses to enforce its own contracts. ICANN collects the registration fees, creates the mess, and leaves free infrastructure services to clean it up.</p><h3>Conclusion: the Trustname Catalyst and the End of Impunity</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*LniNSJBixXi-MXbH.jpg" /></figure><p>While ICANN executives fly across the globe to lavish conferences and approve seven-figure salaries for themselves, the internet they are supposed to govern is burning. Down in the trenches, verified abuse reports containing undeniable proof of cybercrime are routinely ignored by their accredited registrars. The buck is passed forever: registrars play dead, hosting providers recite their favorite fairy tale that they “cannot act as judges,” and the victims are left with nothing. The entire ecosystem is designed to deflect accountability.</p><p>But the era of unchecked impunity is ending, and Trustname will likely be remembered as the beginning of that end. It is the undeniable proof that the system is fundamentally broken. No amount of corporate lobbying, legal defense funds, or PR spin can hide the astronomical volume of cybercrime that ICANN has directly facilitated through its willful negligence.</p><p>ICANN fought tooth and nail to be completely independent and unaccountable. It demanded ultimate authority over internet governance. Yet as the Trustname and NiceNIC syndicates operate with impunity under its banner, ICANN demonstrates in real time that it is entirely incapable of carrying the responsibility it hoarded.</p><p>You wanted the power, ICANN — but you refused the responsibility. Your “vacation” from accountability is over.</p><p>The sheer weight of the crimes you have permitted is about to collapse the very foundation of your trust architecture.</p><h3>Drop the Mask</h3><p>ICANN is not a regulatory body. It is a cartel: it takes the money, rejects oversight, and treats its own contracts — and yours — as decoration.</p><p>Stop paying $155 million a year for the illusion of security.</p><h3>What End-Users and Enterprises Can Do</h3><p>While the cartel counts its fees, defense is on you. Three measures close most of the gap:</p><p><strong>Filter DNS.</strong> Sinkhole known-bad domains with a live blocklist feed — our <a href="https://github.com/phishdestroy/destroylist">destroylist</a> and <a href="https://phishdestroy.io/tools">tools</a> are free and open.</p><p><strong>Score TLD risk at the perimeter.</strong> Block or quarantine traffic to abuse-saturated zones (.top, .icu, .sbs, .cyou and similar) unless your business explicitly needs them.</p><p><strong>Treat newly registered domains as hostile.</strong> Most phishing fires within the first 48 hours of a domain’s life — a window in which ICANN’s paper machine is structurally incapable of reacting. NRD blocking closes it.</p><h3>References</h3><ol><li><a href="https://www.icann.org/uploads/compliance_notice/attachment/1357/hedlund-to-nestsiarovich-16jul26.pdf">ICANN Contractual Compliance — Notice of Breach, Trustname, July 16, 2026 (official PDF)</a></li><li><a href="https://www.icann.org/compliance/notices">ICANN Contractual Compliance Notices — official public archive</a></li><li><a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/approved-with-specs-2013-09-17-en">2013 Registrar Accreditation Agreement, Section 3.18 — Registrar’s abuse-report obligations</a></li><li><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/financials">ICANN Financial Reports — registry / registrar fee revenue</a></li><li><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RegisterFly">RegisterFly — the 2007 ICANN-accredited registrar collapse that triggered RAA reform</a></li><li><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EstDomains">EstDomains — history of the registrar and its 2008 de-accreditation</a></li><li><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epik">Epik — data breaches and collapse</a></li><li><a href="https://phishdestroy.io/trustname-evidence">PhishDestroy — Trustname: Bulletproof Registrar, 35% Phishing Rate (our evidence archive)</a></li><li><a href="https://blog.aa419.org/icann-compliance-complaint-uny-783-11184-namesilo-standards-compliance/">Artists Against 419 — ICANN Compliance Complaint UNY-783–11184: NameSilo (2018–2019, unresolved)</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/phishdestroy/shortdot-evidence">PhishDestroy — shortdot-evidence: open dataset of ShortDot abuse-heavy TLD zones with ICANN’s yearly fee income, updated continuously</a></li><li><a href="https://phishdestroy.io/registrar-accountability/">PhishDestroy — Registrar Accountability scoreboard: 42,000 repeat abuse reports, per-registrar response record</a></li><li><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj">EU Directive 2022/2555 (NIS2), Article 28 — statutory registrant-data verification duties for domain registrars</a></li><li><a href="https://www.icann.org/rdrs-en">ICANN RDRS — the scaled-down, voluntary remnant of the multi-million-dollar SSAD design (launched 2023)</a></li><li><a href="https://apwg.org/trendsreports/">APWG — Phishing Activity Trends Reports (quarterly)</a></li><li><a href="https://www.spamhaus.org/reputation-statistics/">Spamhaus — reputation statistics: most-abused TLDs and registrars</a></li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=0cddf8585088" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[NameSilo Lied to Defend a $20M Crypto Scam— Then Took Down Our Twitter]]></title>
            <link>https://phishdestroy.medium.com/namesilo-lied-to-defend-a-20m-crypto-scam-then-took-down-our-twitter-4904d15d531e?source=rss-98b99bd0b2cb------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4904d15d531e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[investigative-journalism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[icann]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[phishing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[PhishDestroy]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 01 May 2026 05:50:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-05-01T05:50:00.056Z</atom:updated>
            <cc:license>https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/</cc:license>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote><em>A U.S. ICANN-accredited registrar publicly defended a 10-year Monero theft operation, offered to help the operator clean his VirusTotal record, and — once we showed every word of their statement was false — used their paid Gold Checkmark on X to lock our research account. X’s own automation cleared us in writing. The lock is still there. So we’re putting the story everywhere, because they don’t like the truth and we do.</em></blockquote><h3>The short version</h3><p>A U.S. registrar called <strong>NameSilo</strong> publicly defended xmrwallet[.]com — a Monero wallet that has been quietly stealing private keys for about ten years. Estimated damage: $10M–$20M.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ZqAMhD3xXERyJ55DzmYNOQ.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>Long live freedom of speech? Or is this about protecting scammers and lining pockets?</em></p><p>Their defense was a tweet. Four sentences. We went through it sentence by sentence. Every one of them was false, and we said so, with receipts.</p><p>Three weeks later our research account on X — <strong>@Phish_Destroy</strong>, paid Gold Checkmark, never warned, never reported anything fake — went into permanent lockdown. X’s automation reviewed the appeal and wrote back: <em>“no violation, restored to full functionality.”</em> The account is still locked. The Gold subscription is still being billed. We can’t even pull our own posts back out — including the tweets where we tagged NameSilo under older threads from other researchers, which is apparently the part the registrar found unforgivable.</p><p>This wasn’t a one-off either. We’ve been sending NameSilo abuse reports on US-targeting crypto scams since 2023, and through 2024 we sent a lot of them. The pattern was always the same — silence, or a polite reply that nothing was wrong. On this case they didn’t just ignore. They went public defending the operator.</p><p>And three days before NameSilo went public defending him, the scammer himself sent us one sentence about his own registrar that, alone, tells you everything you need to know about this story. We’ll get to that line in Section 5.</p><p><strong>A small Easter egg for NameSilo:</strong> we run on the Hydra principle. Cut down one link — five more grow back.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PAfFbQt4F0iHr7d-7_gUhw.jpeg" /></figure><h3>1. How this actually started — a GitHub Issue and a warning the scammer chose to ignore</h3><p>Honest framing first, because it matters.</p><p>I wasn’t running some big targeted operation against xmrwallet[.]com. I opened a GitHub Issue in the scammer&#39;s repo — a repo that, by the way, has nothing technically to do with the website itself, since the site sits behind DDoS-Guard. Just an Issue.</p><p>The operator wrote to abuse@phishdestroy.io off the back of that Issue. February 16, signed N.R., asking us — politely at first — to take the report down:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/963/1*U07actTVaGoVq1CT882EMA.png" /></figure><blockquote>“Hi, You are incorrect with your report. There is no phishing going on with xmrwallet.com, this is the official domain name for xmrwallet. We are an open source crypto wallet that is non-custodial, we don’t store seeds or keys, everything is done in your browser locally. Please remove your report on us, thank you. N.R.”</blockquote><p>The first email — the operator asks us, politely, to take the report down.</p><p>So we answered him. Same day. Calm, professional, technical, and explicit about how this would go from here:</p><blockquote>“Hello, Let’s keep this clear and professional.</blockquote><blockquote>Analysis of phishing schemes and wallet abuse is a specialized field, and this case has already raised multiple technical indicators that warrant attention. The observations are based on actual production behavior and are reproducible. At the moment, this is not a full audit — just a focused review driven by professional interest.”</blockquote><p>Then we walked him through the actual technical observations. Plainly. Client-side transaction generated but explicitly discarded (raw_tx_and_hash.raw = 0). Backend constructing its own transaction independently of the client one. Production-only parameters — session_key, verification, encrypted payload — that don&#39;t exist in the public GitHub repository. The session_key carrying the full wallet address and the private view key in base64. A non-standard type == &#39;swept&#39; transaction paired with &quot;Unknown transaction id,&quot; indicating server-side initiated operations not traceable through standard tooling. An observable divergence between his public GitHub code and the production behavior of his own site.</p><p>And we told him, in writing, exactly what would happen next:</p><blockquote>“The current assessment stands and is technically grounded. The behavior aligns with known high-risk transaction handling patterns. Dismissing findings without addressing these mechanics does not change the conclusion.</blockquote><blockquote>If this remains a technical discussion, it stays at this level.</blockquote><blockquote>If it escalates — through continued denial or misrepresentation — it may justify a complete end-to-end audit with full documentation, reproducible evidence, and formal submission to relevant security and infrastructure channels.</blockquote><blockquote><strong>Nothing here is based on assumptions — only on observable system behavior and verifiable logic. What happens next depends entirely on how you choose to proceed.”</strong></blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/939/1*JUPXM8ODVQNEXpx7XF_Ltw.png" /><figcaption><em>Our reply, same day. Technical, professional, and explicit: “What happens next depends entirely on how you choose to proceed.”</em></figcaption></figure><p>Read that last line again. <em>“What happens next depends entirely on how you choose to proceed.”</em> On the record, in writing, time-stamped February 16. We told him exactly what we’d do, before doing any of it.</p><p>That email is not a threat. It’s a courtesy. We give it because we work hard to be transparent and accurate, and we genuinely don’t want to put more time into a deeper case if there’s a chance we’re wrong. Any security researcher will know the reflex — false positives are the single worst thing in our line of work, and the easiest way to avoid one is to give the subject a clean exit before you commit further resources.</p><p>A person with even average self-preservation instincts would have read that email once, gone quiet, and kept running their site without ever writing to us again. That option was right there, in plain text, on February 16.</p><p>He didn’t take it. He kept writing. He kept arguing. Later, when domains he liked started getting acted on by other registrars, he came back accusing us of “killing three of his domains,” treating the investigation like personal harassment instead of the documented, reproducible analysis it actually was.</p><p>So we did exactly what we’d already told him we’d do. We went deeper. We documented every endpoint. We published. <strong>Each step of that escalation was, on the record, a response to one of his.</strong> None of it was unprovoked.</p><p>Three weeks later, his registrar — the one he wasn’t afraid of — picked up exactly where he left off. Same posture. Same tone. Same wave-it-away dismissal of the work.</p><p>Two parties, scammer and registrar, both made the same mistake, and neither of them made it just once.</p><h3>2. Every move we made was a response</h3><p>The framing the scammer pushed, and the registrar later echoed, is that we are some kind of attack squad picking on independent operators. It’s worth being clear about what actually happened, in order:</p><ul><li><strong>The investigation only escalated because the operator escalated it.</strong> Every step on our side — the technical breakdown, the repeated abuse reports, the public thread, the formal escalation to ICANN — landed only after a fresh action from his side. Denial. Reposted lies. Attacks on other researchers. Attempts to wipe reviews and bury repos. We had told him in the first email exactly how this would go: <em>“What happens next depends entirely on how you choose to proceed.”</em> He chose to proceed loudly.</li><li><strong>Then NameSilo decided to make it their problem.</strong> The smart move was silence — quietly act on the abuse report, or quietly do nothing. Instead they published a tweet declaring their abuse team had done a deep review, that the scammer was “the victim,” that no abuse reports had ever been received, and that they were going to help him scrub his VirusTotal detections.</li></ul><p>After a public statement like that, from the registrar of the domain, the responsible move on our side was not to go quiet. The responsible move was to keep the receipts visible, refuse to let the lie stand unopposed, and tag the registrar under the older threads from other researchers who had been documenting xmrwallet for years before us. Anything else would have been complicity.</p><p>That was apparently the conduct that tipped NameSilo into using the Gold Checkmark channel on X. <strong>Refusing to fall silent in the face of a public lie was the “violation.”</strong> If that’s the rule, then the rule is the problem.</p><h3>3. Their statement, taken apart line by line</h3><p>March 13, 2026. NameSilo’s official account posts this under our investigation thread:</p><blockquote>“Our Abuse team conducted an in-depth review into this case and it seems that domain was compromised a few months ago (during which a copy of the webpage was replaced with a crypto-drainer). Prior to that, we had received no abuse reports related to this domain. After an extensive review…”</blockquote><p>Permanently archived: <a href="https://ghostarchive.org/archive/CXXZ0">ghostarchive.org/archive/CXXZ0</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/648/1*saIKu-yt3a-gSKtVXpCI6A.png" /><figcaption>NameSilo’s actual statement — published under our investigation thread, March 13, 2026.</figcaption></figure><p>NameSilo’s actual statement — published under our investigation thread, March 13, 2026.</p><p>I sat down with that tweet and went through it line by line. Four sentences. Four lies. Not “differently interpreted.” Not “out of date.” Not “a misunderstanding.” False.</p><h4>Claim 1: “Domain was compromised a few months ago.”</h4><p>The theft code <em>is</em> the website. Eight PHP endpoints, server-side key exfiltration, Base64 transmission to operator infrastructure, all sitting there for roughly a decade. Nothing was injected. The thing was built to steal from day one.</p><h4>Claim 2: “Prior to that, we had received no abuse reports.”</h4><p>We’ve sent <strong>20+ abuse reports</strong> through their own portal between 2023 and 2026. We have the delivery receipts. Either their abuse team has no idea what reports they actually receive, or they know and lied anyway. Both are bad.</p><h4>Claim 3: “After an extensive review… not involving the registrant.”</h4><p>The operator wrote to us himself, defending his code as his own work. He never claimed a hack. NameSilo’s “review” apparently never asked him.</p><h4>Claim 4: “Working with the registrant to remove the website from VT reports.”</h4><p>That isn’t abuse handling. That’s <strong>helping a confirmed scammer scrub his security warnings while the drainer is still live.</strong></p><p>Meanwhile three other registrars looked at the exact same evidence and acted in days:</p><ul><li><strong>PublicDomainRegistry (PDR)</strong> — suspended.</li><li><strong>WebNic</strong> — suspended.</li><li><strong>NICENIC</strong> — suspended.</li></ul><p>NameSilo alone went on TV and called the thief “the victim.” Full technical breakdown of the wallet itself: <a href="https://phishdestroy.io/xmrwallet-namesilo-exposed">phishdestroy.io/xmrwallet-namesilo-exposed</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Tc6rG-Yyg1l2p6FcigsAGg.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://ghostarchive.org/archive/CXXZ0">https://ghostarchive.org/archive/CXXZ0</a> Yeah, yeah, we knew Namesilo would do exactly what he did</figcaption></figure><p>And take that fourth claim seriously, because it’s the one people are sleeping on. A registrar’s small in-house abuse team, looking at a confirmed phishing site that steals private keys, that has been live for a decade, that has been flagged by multiple authoritative security vendors — including Fortune-500-grade vendors that build the security telemetry the rest of the industry leans on — is publicly announcing that they’re going to <strong>help the registrant get those detections removed</strong>.</p><p>That is an enormous amount of confidence for a small abuse team to walk in with. Their position is that they have looked at this case more carefully than every authoritative vendor that flagged it, and concluded everyone else is wrong. That isn’t a disagreement. That’s a public sneer at the entire profession — at every researcher, at every vendor, at every other registrar that already suspended.</p><p>The scammer had done exactly the same thing in his own emails — accusing us of “killing three of his domains,” dismissing our findings as personal harassment instead of the documented work it is. Three weeks later his registrar published the same posture in their official voice.</p><p>After we replied with the full breakdown, the tone from NameSilo’s side stopped sounding like “abuse team review” and started sounding like a company that had been caught. Two weeks later, our Twitter went down.</p><h3>4. We posted the receipts. Publicly. While we still had an account.</h3><p>Once their defense of the scammer was up, we replied with the only thing that matters in this work — proof.</p><blockquote><strong>March 16:</strong> “Let’s be direct. <strong>@NameSilo is lying.</strong> They claimed xmrwallet[.]com was ‘compromised’ — hacked by a third party. The operator’s own emails to us, written BEFORE NameSilo got involved, prove the ‘hack’ story was fabricated. We have the receipts.”</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/658/1*5cV1_zOMi986ybI7Hc1-Bw.png" /></figure><blockquote><strong>March 16, thread:</strong> “🚨 @NameSilo is acting as press secretary for a $2M+ Monero theft operation. xmrwallet[.]com steals private keys since 2016. 6 security vendors flag it. 3 registrars suspended it. NameSilo called the scammer ‘the victim’ and is helping him remove virustotal warnings.”</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/628/1*TnfGV_Jx4Wen6_GMrbtfgQ.png" /></figure><blockquote><strong>March 16:</strong> “Honest question for @NameSilo: Who is this operator to you? Employee? Contractor? Friend of support staff? Relative? Because he told us ‘subpoena the registrar’ like a man who already had your answer. 3 registrars suspended him. You wrote him a defense.”</blockquote><blockquote>“We’ve now proven that <strong>@NameSilo’s abuse team intentionally lied</strong> in their public response. The operator’s own emails — written before NameSilo got involved — contradict every claim they made. NameSilo is covering for this operator. The reason is theirs to explain.”</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/613/1*SZMwzfjUSBIsPrSHRftK9Q.png" /></figure><p><strong>March 18</strong>, formal escalation: <em>“Because no response or action has been provided, and due to what appears to be deliberately false statements made to protect a fraud operator, we have forwarded the full investigation materials to @ICANN Contractual Compliance, relevant regulatory authorities, and law enforcement…”</em></p><p>That, near as we can tell, is what got the account locked. A researcher quoting a registrar’s own emails back at them and notifying ICANN.</p><h3>5. The scammer wasn’t afraid of his own registrar. That’s the whole story.</h3><p>This is the line that should make every reader stop scrolling. From the operator, in writing, in an email to us dated <strong>February 17, 2026</strong> — three weeks before NameSilo went public defending him:</p><blockquote>“Feel free to subpoena the domain registrar for my information.”</blockquote><p>Read it again.</p><p>A guy running a ten-year crypto drainer, on $550-a-month bulletproof hosting in Belize, sitting behind Russian DDoS-Guard, just calmly invited us to subpoena his own registrar. Nobody behaves like that with a registrar that might shut them down. Nobody behaves like that unless they already know how the registrar is going to react.</p><p>Three days later, that same registrar called him “the victim” in public.</p><p>I’m going to say this plainly because I’ve thought about every other explanation and none of them fits:</p><blockquote><strong>The operator of </strong><strong>xmrwallet[.]com is connected to someone inside NameSilo.</strong> Staff, reseller-account holder, friend of an abuse-team person — something. The &quot;honest mistake on a single review&quot; version doesn&#39;t survive contact with the facts. Three other registrars looked at the same evidence and suspended in days. NameSilo wrote a press release for the guy.</blockquote><h3>6. The smoking gun: X cleared us. The lock didn’t move.</h3><p>Quick clarification, because most people don’t know this: the <strong>Gold Checkmark</strong> on X is not the $8 blue thing. It’s the Verified Organization tier — costs an organization real money per month, and one of its main perks is <strong>direct access to a live human support agent at X</strong>. Both NameSilo and PhishDestroy hold one. We bought ours assuming it’d protect us from drive-by troll reports. NameSilo, on the evidence here, used theirs to file a takedown.</p><p>We even said it would happen, before it happened. We posted on Twitter — and notarized it in <a href="https://ghostarchive.org/archive/CXXZ0">GhostArchive</a> before the lock dropped — that NameSilo would try to silence us the same way the scammer silences everyone else. They did. Right on schedule. <em>Yeah, yeah — we knew NameSilo would do exactly what they did.</em></p><h3>Email #1 — the lock</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/849/1*D9CAJpwYmYFiOvJABvaCbQ.png" /></figure><p><em>“Our support team has determined that a violation against inauthentic behaviors [occurred]. We will not overturn our decision.”</em></p><p>No tweet quoted. No specific rule cited. No example. Just a verdict. That’s not what an automated rule trigger looks like. That’s what a human agent decision looks like, after a complaint.</p><p>And it’s worth noting <em>what</em> we were doing in the days before the lock came down. We were tagging NameSilo, in public, under <strong>older threads from other researchers</strong> who had documented xmrwallet[.]com long before us — pulling those receipts back into the timeline so the registrar&#39;s &quot;we received no abuse reports&quot; claim would be visible next to other people&#39;s evidence too. That, near as we can tell, is the actual conduct that broke their patience. Not insults. Not doxxing. Not anything against X&#39;s rules. Just dragging old, archived proof into the registrar&#39;s mentions and refusing to let the public statement quietly age out of view.</p><h3>Email #2 — and now they contradict themselves</h3><p>Subject line, in their own words: <strong>“[4] Your account has been restored.”</strong> Date: April 15, 2026.</p><blockquote>“Hello, We have reviewed your appeal request for account, @Phish_Destroy. <strong>Our automated systems have determined there was no violation and have restored your account to full functionality.</strong> Thanks, X Support.”</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/849/1*D9CAJpwYmYFiOvJABvaCbQ.png" /></figure><p>X Support, on appeal: <em>“no violation, restored to full functionality.”</em></p><p>The subject line in their own words: <em>“Your account has been restored.”</em> Dated April 15, 2026.</p><h3>Reality check, today</h3><ul><li>The account is <strong>still locked</strong>.</li><li>The Gold subscription <strong>is still being billed</strong>.</li><li>We <strong>cannot pull down our own posts</strong> — the very tweets that put NameSilo on the spot are now invisible to us, on our own account.</li><li>No third email has rolled back Email #2. It just stands there, contradicting reality.</li></ul><p>So one of two things is true:</p><ol><li>Email #2 is real. The automation said “no violation, restore.” A human agent then manually overrode the machine after a Gold-tier complaint came in. The human kept the lock the automation lifted.</li><li>Email #2 is wrong. X sent a false restoration notice and never bothered to correct it, while continuing to bill a paid subscriber for a frozen account.</li></ol><p>Either version is the same conclusion in different words. <strong>The Gold Checkmark “live human support” channel on X can be used by paying corporate accounts to silence whistleblowers.</strong> NameSilo paid for priority access to X moderators, and that access produced a ban that X’s own automation had already thrown out. That’s not content moderation. That’s concierge censorship that you can buy.</p><h3>7. The same handwriting</h3><p>Look at the pattern, side by side, and try not to see it.</p><p>The scammer’s whole career, when caught: make the evidence go away. Fake DMCA the GitHub repo. Mass-report the Trustpilot reviewer. Get the BitcoinTalk thread buried. Spam-report the YouTube video. Find the “report abuse” button on whatever platform the critic is on, and pull it.</p><p>NameSilo, when caught lying about him: make the evidence go away. File a complaint through the Gold Checkmark channel on X. Get the research account locked. Lock the researcher out of his own posts so he can’t redistribute them. Hope the audience moves on.</p><p>Same handwriting. The scammer learned to delete people who tell the truth. NameSilo just did the same thing on a corporate scale.</p><h3>8. NameSilo, not NICENIC, is the worst registrar we have ever dealt with</h3><p>For two years our internal worst-registrar list had <strong>NICENIC</strong> at the top. Slow, lazy, hosts a lot of garbage, ignores most of what you send them. We are correcting that ranking, in public, today.</p><blockquote><strong>The worst registrar PhishDestroy has ever encountered is NameSilo.</strong></blockquote><p>And it is important to be precise about why, because the registrars we usually call “the bad ones” are not the real enemy in this story. Let me break it down:</p><ul><li><strong>NICENIC, WebNic, PDR, Key-Systems, ENOM, Dynadot</strong> — the registrars with the worst reputation for abuse handling — are <em>slow</em>. They <em>ignore</em> reports. They make you send three follow-ups. They sometimes never respond at all. That is bad. It is reasonable to be angry at them. But that is the entire scope of their failure.</li><li><strong>None</strong> of those registrars has ever stood up in public and called a confirmed crypto-drainer “the victim of a hack.”</li><li><strong>None</strong> of them has ever published a tweet declaring that they are going to help an active scammer get his VirusTotal detections removed.</li><li><strong>None</strong> of them has ever told the public, on the record, that they “received no abuse reports” about a domain that has been reported dozens of times through their own portal with delivery receipts to prove it.</li><li><strong>None</strong> of them, to our knowledge, has ever weaponised a paid X support channel to silence a researcher who quoted their own emails back at them.</li></ul><p>Those registrars are messy infrastructure providers. <strong>NameSilo turned itself into a propaganda department for a $20M fraud operation.</strong> That is a different category of failure entirely.</p><p>To be even clearer: silence is not the same as defense. Ignoring a report is not the same as <em>publicly siding with the operator</em>. Slow processing is not the same as <em>actively helping the scammer scrub his security record</em>. Sloppy abuse handling is not the same as <em>lying in your official voice and then banning the witness</em>. NICENIC is bad at its job. NameSilo, on this case, decided to do a different job — and the job they chose was protecting the thief.</p><p>And this is not a one-domain story. In our records, NameSilo is tied to <strong>hundreds of active crypto-scam domains targeting U.S. users</strong>. Across two years of work, we have watched the same pattern over and over: reports submitted, reports ignored, scams kept running. Until xmrwallet[.]com, the worst we&#39;d seen from NameSilo was institutional negligence. With xmrwallet[.]com, they crossed into something else — public defense of the operator, public help with his detections, public retaliation against the people who proved them wrong.</p><p>If a registrar that ignores reports is “bad,” there is no word strong enough yet for what NameSilo has put on the record here. We are settling for “the worst registrar PhishDestroy has ever encountered.” It will do for now.</p><h3>9. From now on, every report is public — with timestamps and explicit consent for court use</h3><p>One operational change came directly out of this case. We’d assumed, naively, that an ICANN-accredited registrar maintained an honest accounting of the abuse reports it received and acted on. NameSilo’s <em>“prior to that, we had received no abuse reports”</em> — published over our 20+ delivery-receipted submissions — proved that assumption wrong. Either there’s no proper intake control on their side, or there is and the public statement was knowingly false. Either reading is its own scandal.</p><p>So:</p><ul><li>Every abuse report we file is <strong>also published live</strong> on <a href="https://phishdestroy.io">phishdestroy.io</a>, alongside the registrar’s response — or their silence.</li><li>Each report carries a <strong>delivery timestamp</strong>, so the registrar’s response window is publicly counted in days, not in private tickets that can later be claimed to have never arrived.</li><li>Every report carries our <strong>explicit, written consent for the published evidence to be used as-is in any legal, regulatory, or law-enforcement proceeding</strong>. By victims, by prosecutors, by ICANN, by any court. No further authorization required from us. Take it, file it, attach it.</li></ul><p>This is the direct answer to “we received no abuse reports.” There’s now a public ledger and a clock on the wall. If a registrar claims a report never arrived, anyone can go read the report.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/631/1*-6xseiK4PE1ijHu4edgkgA.png" /><figcaption>PhishDestroy Threat Intelligence Platform — the actual operation NameSilo tried to silence.</figcaption></figure><h3>10. What we’re working on next: the archive and “njan la”</h3><p>We’re currently tracking a strangely high volume of DDoS traffic hitting phishdestroy.io from infrastructure tied to the <strong>&quot;njan la&quot;</strong> hosting ecosystem. We&#39;ll map that. But while we do, our primary focus is shifting to something much bigger: the historical record.</p><p>We’re pulling every abuse report we filed against NameSilo-registered domains between <strong>2022 and 2024</strong> — the absolute peak of the crypto-drainer and pig-butchering epidemics. During that era, NameSilo’s favourite reseller, <strong>“njan la”</strong>, was the undisputed king of bulletproof infrastructure. We’re going to start asking the uncomfortable questions: how much money was made selling overpriced, abuse-tolerant domains before “njan la” quietly shut down its public API? And is “njan la” actually an independent reseller, or something much closer to a subsidiary?</p><p>NameSilo acted like missing 20 reports on a single domain was a simple discrepancy. For context: over the years our project has discovered and reported between <strong>300,000 and 500,000 malicious domains</strong> across the internet. Let’s be clear — digging into NameSilo’s history is not revenge for our Twitter ban. We expected the ban because we had thoroughly studied how their scammer operates (and notice, I’m still formally treating the operator as a separate person, even if the facts heavily suggest otherwise). All actions we take here are strictly investigative, not offensive.</p><p>We’re going to publish the complete, historical archive of PhishDestroy reports sent to NameSilo. Not to brag about scale — there is nothing to be proud of as long as entities like NameSilo and its “resellers” profit from scamming ordinary people. They hide behind excuses like “freedom of speech” while charging two-to-five-times premiums for bulletproof ignorance of abuse. I’m not a lawyer, but the pattern is staggering.</p><p>Since NameSilo claims they don’t receive reports — or simply lose them — <strong>we will become their permanent, public archive</strong>. Scammers can look at it to write NameSilo a thank-you note for ignoring so many of our complaints. Victims can look at it to realise that if this registrar had simply enforced basic ICANN rules, their life savings might still be intact. But NameSilo doesn’t seem to care about that. They’re too busy volunteering to scrub VirusTotal detections for the thieves.</p><p>Both the reseller analysis and the source-IP DDoS breakdown will be published on <a href="https://phishdestroy.io">phishdestroy.io</a> when they’re ready.</p><h3>11. Why this is going up in more than one place</h3><p>NameSilo doesn’t like the truth. We do. So this article is going on Medium, on our own site, in the GitHub evidence repo, and in GhostArchive — all the places we already use to keep the case file from disappearing. There’s no campaign, no petition, no “demand action.” Just facts, in more than one location, with timestamps.</p><p>If you’re a victim of xmrwallet[.]com and you need the evidence package for a report or a filing, it&#39;s permanently available at <a href="https://phishdestroy.io">phishdestroy.io</a> or <a href="mailto:report@phishdestroy.io">report@phishdestroy.io</a>. Take whatever you need.</p><h3>12. A short note to the scammer and his registrar</h3><p>I understand the truth is uncomfortable for both of you. You’ll find the report button without my help.</p><p>But the question stands: do you actually believe the truth about what you did can be erased?</p><p>It can’t. The receipts exist. The archives exist. The screenshots exist. Every move you make to take this down only adds another timestamp to the file.</p><p>You can keep clicking. It changes nothing.</p><h3>Final word</h3><p>We told the public, in advance, that NameSilo would try to silence us. We notarized that prediction in <a href="https://ghostarchive.org/archive/CXXZ0">GhostArchive</a> before the lock dropped. They did exactly what we said they would do.</p><p>And here is the article they were trying to prevent.</p><blockquote><strong>Scammers delete evidence. NameSilo defended one. X locked our account. The archive remains. The truth remains. We remain.</strong></blockquote><h3>Sources &amp; permanent archives</h3><ul><li>NameSilo’s original tweet, archived: <a href="https://ghostarchive.org/archive/CXXZ0">ghostarchive.org/archive/CXXZ0</a></li><li>Full technical investigation of xmrwallet[.]com: <a href="https://phishdestroy.io/xmrwallet-namesilo-exposed">phishdestroy.io/xmrwallet-namesilo-exposed</a></li><li>How NameSilo killed our Twitter — full evidence dossier: <a href="https://phishdestroy.io/namesilo-killed-our-twitter">phishdestroy.io/namesilo-killed-our-twitter</a></li><li>Earlier Medium write-up on the scam itself: <a href="https://phishdestroy.medium.com/xmrwallet-com-2953f35b8a79">phishdestroy.medium.com/xmrwallet-com-2953f35b8a79</a></li><li>GitHub evidence repository: <a href="https://github.com/phishdestroy/DO-NOT-USE-xmrwallet-com">github.com/phishdestroy/DO-NOT-USE-xmrwallet-com</a></li></ul><p><em>PhishDestroy Research — </em><a href="https://phishdestroy.io"><em>phishdestroy.io</em></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4904d15d531e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[xmrwallet.com]]></title>
            <link>https://phishdestroy.medium.com/xmrwallet-com-2953f35b8a79?source=rss-98b99bd0b2cb------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2953f35b8a79</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[monero]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[scam]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[PhishDestroy]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 16 Mar 2026 13:27:07 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-03-16T18:05:04.389Z</atom:updated>
            <cc:license>https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/</cc:license>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>xmrwallet.com Scam Exposed: NameSilo Called a $2M Monero Theft a “Hack” — Then Became the Scammer’s Press Secretary</h3><p>A registrar fabricated a “compromise” story to protect a phishing domain flagged by Fortinet, Webroot, and 4 other security vendors. Three peer registrars suspended the same evidence. NameSilo chose to defend the thief. If they’re this committed to protecting him — perhaps they should also cover his debts to the victims.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GpMuuvLbb23AW13eW8Y8BQ.png" /><figcaption>xmrwallet[.]com — scam which Namesilo defend</figcaption></figure><p>This investigation was conducted by <a href="https://phishdestroy.io"><strong>PhishDestroy Research</strong></a> — an independent cybersecurity team that tracks, documents, and destroys phishing infrastructure. Full evidence: <a href="https://phishdestroy.github.io/DO-NOT-USE-xmrwallet-com/">phishdestroy.github.io/DO-NOT-USE-xmrwallet-com</a>. Repository: <a href="https://github.com/phishdestroy/DO-NOT-USE-xmrwallet-com">github.com/phishdestroy/DO-NOT-USE-xmrwallet-com</a>.</p><p><strong>xmrwallet.com</strong> has operated since 2016, marketing itself as a free, open-source Monero wallet. A <a href="https://phishdestroy.github.io/DO-NOT-USE-xmrwallet-com/">live network capture</a> on February 18, 2026 proved the site <strong>steals private Monero view keys on every login</strong> and <strong>hijacks transactions server-side</strong>. Fifteen documented victims across <a href="https://www.trustpilot.com/review/www.xmrwallet.com">Trustpilot</a>, <a href="https://www.sitejabber.com/reviews/xmrwallet.com">Sitejabber</a>, and <a href="https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5540097.0">BitcoinTalk</a>. Six security vendors on <a href="https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/www.xmrwallet.com">VirusTotal</a> flag it as malicious. Estimated stolen: <strong>$2M+</strong>.</p><p>Abuse reports were filed with all registrars. Three suspended their domains within days. The fourth — <strong>NameSilo, LLC</strong> — contacted the scammer, believed his story, and published a defense so absurd it deserves a line-by-line autopsy.</p><h3>NameSilo’s public statement — verbatim</h3><blockquote>“Our Abuse team conducted an in-depth review into this case and it seems that domain was compromised a few months ago (during which a copy of the webpage was replaced with a crypto-drainer). Prior to that, we had received no abuse reports related to this domain. After an extensive investigation, our team found evidence of the compromise not involving the registrant, and they immediately took steps to reverse it. The registrant is also working to get the website delisted from VT reports. Are you able to confirm if the abuse you’re seeing is recent or from this initial hack? If you have any new evidence of abuse taking place, please send it over to us (at support@namesilo.com if that’s more preferable) and we will re-open the investigation again.”</blockquote><p>Seven claims. Seven lies. Let’s go.</p><h3>LIE #1: “The domain was compromised”</h3><p>NameSilo says someone hacked xmrwallet.com and injected a crypto-drainer.</p><p>The theft mechanism is not injected code. It is the <strong>core architecture</strong> of the application — a complete session system built across 8 PHP endpoints, transmitting the victim’s private view key 40+ times per session.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ghx5ZG-N2T6Fulh8cceJdw.png" /><figcaption>Neimsilo, a highly experienced abuse department, is looking for ways to shield its client from the truth</figcaption></figure><p>Every login sends your private key to /auth.php. The server returns a session_key — not a random token, but your address and view key in Base64:</p><pre>session_key = [blob]:[base64(address)]:[base64(viewkey)]</pre><pre># Verify:<br>import base64<br>print(base64.b64decode(<br>  &quot;ZWZiYTEzZWNiOGIzNjA2NjBhM2RjYWFmYWY3Y2Y5OTE0OTcxM2QwNjRiOWQ2NDk5N2IyNDU0ZDU4ZWU2NzgwMA==&quot;<br>).decode())<br># → efba13ecb8b360660a3dcaafaf7cf99149713d064b9d64997b2454d58ee67800<br>#   ^^^ real private view key from live capture</pre><p>This key is re-sent on <strong>every request</strong> — to /getheightsync.php (12×), /gettransactions.php (10×), /getbalance.php (6×), /dashboard.html (4×), and more. Full capture data: <a href="https://phishdestroy.github.io/DO-NOT-USE-xmrwallet-com/">PhishDestroy evidence page</a>.</p><p>When you send XMR:</p><pre>raw_tx_and_hash.raw = 0    // your transaction — discarded, never broadcast</pre><pre>if (type == &#39;swept&#39;) {     // custom theft flag — not in Monero protocol<br>    txid = &#39;Unknown transaction id&#39;<br>}</pre><p>A hidden backdoor phones home automatically — /support_login.html with hardcoded session 8de50123dab32. Not user-initiated. Not in the GitHub code. Documented in <a href="https://phishdestroy.github.io/DO-NOT-USE-xmrwallet-com/cache-issue35/">cached Issue #35</a>.</p><p>The GitHub repository has a <strong>5.3-year commit gap</strong> (2018–2024). The Wayback Machine shows no session_key in 2023 — but it&#39;s in production in 2025. This system was built over years, not injected in a hack.</p><p><strong>Does NameSilo believe a hacker built a complete PHP backend with 8 endpoints, a Base64 key exfiltration protocol, a transaction hijacking mechanism, and a hardcoded backdoor — as part of a “compromise”?</strong> Or is NameSilo just repeating what the scammer told them?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*XgdijYbpqIp1okyHg9SZRw.png" /><figcaption>An Old Russian Dog That Removes the Issue</figcaption></figure><h3>LIE #2: “We had received no abuse reports”</h3><p>This is the lie that proves NameSilo never investigated anything.</p><p>Here is what existed — <strong>publicly, for years</strong> — before any report was filed with NameSilo:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_6zB4Po4NyAl5kg1P4aYRQ.png" /><figcaption>The Truth About the Old Russian Dog</figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/www.xmrwallet.com"><strong>VirusTotal</strong></a> — six vendors flag xmrwallet.com. <strong>Fortinet</strong> (Fortune 500, FortiGuard Labs, 700,000+ organizations): “Phishing.” <strong>Webroot/OpenText</strong> (BrightCloud threat intel): “Malicious.” <strong>ADMINUSLabs</strong>: “Malicious.” <strong>CyRadar</strong>: “Malicious.” <strong>Lionic</strong>: “Malicious.” <strong>Seclookup</strong>: “Malicious.” These are <strong>automated systems</strong> — they crawl, analyze, and classify every domain on the internet continuously. They don’t file “abuse reports.” They just flag threats. The data was there for anyone to see.</p><p><a href="https://urlquery.net/report/a56ea134-19f0-467f-88c3-3444f5c49c06"><strong>URLQuery</strong></a> — automated analysis flagged the domain. Public report, publicly accessible, predating 2026.</p><p><a href="https://www.scamadviser.com/check-website/xmrwallet.com"><strong>ScamAdviser</strong></a> — “very low trust score.” The automated analysis notes: “registrar has high percentage of fraud sites” and “owner identity hidden via privacy service.”</p><p><a href="https://www.trustpilot.com/review/www.xmrwallet.com"><strong>Trustpilot</strong></a> — multiple theft reports going back years. $200 stolen. 17.44 XMR stolen (with TxID and TX Key documented). Funds redirected to unknown wallets. Transaction verification failing.</p><p><a href="https://www.sitejabber.com/reviews/xmrwallet.com"><strong>Sitejabber</strong></a> — <strong>590 XMR (~$177,000) stolen</strong> in a single report. 20 XMR stolen. Rating: 1.5/5. Reports calling the site “fake” and “scammers.”</p><p><a href="https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5540097.0"><strong>BitcoinTalk</strong></a> — the largest cryptocurrency forum in the world has a public warning thread: <strong>“[WARNING] XMRWallet.com Scams — Stay vigilant!”</strong></p><p><strong>Reddit r/Monero</strong> — the operator (u/WiseSolution) was <strong>banned from the official Monero subreddit in 2018</strong>. Eight years before NameSilo’s “review.”</p><p>Searching “xmrwallet.com” on VirusTotal takes <strong>five seconds</strong>. Googling “xmrwallet.com scam” returns a wall of warnings on the <strong>first page</strong>. Checking Trustpilot takes <strong>one click</strong>.</p><p><strong>“No prior abuse reports”</strong> means one of two things: NameSilo’s “in-depth review” didn’t include a single Google search — or they found all of this and are lying about it. Which is it, NameSilo?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OAmeUXSliGgOo99MMOsWiw.png" /><figcaption>Oh, come on — how could a scammer be running a DDoS attack on the guard these days???</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*XF34w62dzXu8IpBJmZR_ow.png" /><figcaption>Will Namesilo help set the record straight????</figcaption></figure><h3>LIE #3: “Evidence of the compromise not involving the registrant”</h3><p>Translation: NameSilo contacted the scammer, the scammer said “I was hacked,” and NameSilo wrote it down as an “investigation.”</p><p>Here’s what this “innocent registrant” has been doing:</p><p><strong>Registered four escape domains</strong> — xmrwallet.cc, xmrwallet.biz, xmrwallet.net, xmrwallet.me — across four different registrars, each prepaid 5–10 years. Registered <em>before</em> the investigation was published. Deliberately spread to slow coordinated takedowns. (<a href="https://phishdestroy.github.io/DO-NOT-USE-xmrwallet-com/">Full domain analysis</a>)</p><p><strong>Deleted 21+ GitHub issues</strong> documenting fraud — over eight years. Deleted Issues #35 and #36 (the full technical proof) the same day two escape domains were suspended. (<a href="https://phishdestroy.github.io/DO-NOT-USE-xmrwallet-com/deleted.html">Archived deleted evidence</a>)</p><p><strong>Zero technical rebuttals in eight years.</strong> Not one network capture. Not one code audit. Not one explanation for session_key, raw = 0, or the backdoor. (<a href="https://phishdestroy.github.io/DO-NOT-USE-xmrwallet-com/cache-issue35/">Cached Issue #35</a> · <a href="https://phishdestroy.github.io/DO-NOT-USE-xmrwallet-com/cache-issue36/">Cached Issue #36</a>)</p><p><strong>$550/month bulletproof hosting</strong> (IQWeb FZ-LLC, Belize) behind <strong>DDoS-Guard</strong> (Russia) — for a “free open-source client-side” project. GitHub Pages costs $0. (<a href="https://phishdestroy.github.io/DO-NOT-USE-xmrwallet-com/">Infrastructure IOCs</a>)</p><p><strong>Banned from r/Monero in 2018.</strong> (<a href="https://phishdestroy.github.io/DO-NOT-USE-xmrwallet-com/posts/post-nathalie-roy-xmrwallet.html">Operator profile</a>)</p><p><strong>50+ paid SEO articles</strong> across crypto media to bury negative results. <strong>Zero donation wallets</strong> despite claiming “funded by donations.” (<a href="https://phishdestroy.github.io/DO-NOT-USE-xmrwallet-com/posts/post-xmrwallet-scam-exposed.html">Full exposure article</a>)</p><p><strong>Four Google trackers</strong> (GTM, GA, GA4, DoubleClick) inside a “privacy” wallet. No legitimate Monero wallet does this — not <a href="https://getmonero.org/downloads">Monero GUI</a>, not <a href="https://featherwallet.org">Feather Wallet</a>, not <a href="https://cakewallet.com">Cake Wallet</a>, not <a href="https://monerujo.io">Monerujo</a>.</p><p>Hacked website owners publish incident reports and fix their code. This operator deletes evidence, buys escape domains, hires new developers for captcha systems, and pays for SEO campaigns. <strong>That’s not a victim. That’s an operation.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*N5PDaFzR-PrCTOCXul2OrA.png" /><figcaption>Is Namesilo getting carried away? Or maybe njan.la? Who over there likes scammers?</figcaption></figure><h3>LIE #4: “They immediately took steps to reverse it”</h3><p>Reverse what?</p><p>The session_key exfiltration is in production <strong>right now</strong>. The raw_tx_and_hash.raw = 0 is in production <strong>right now</strong>. The Google trackers are firing <strong>right now</strong>. The DDoS-Guard hosting is active <strong>right now</strong>. The <a href="http://xmrtor3fsapuu6y26za7vpzox4vpaj6ny5viq2arbmozm7kg6jitnlid.onion">Tor hidden service</a> runs identical code <strong>right now</strong>.</p><p>The GitHub repository has <strong>zero commits</strong> addressing any security incident. No changelog. No patch. No incident report.</p><p><strong>Nothing was “reversed.” The theft code is the product. It has always been the product.</strong></p><h3>LIE #5: “The registrant is working to get delisted from VT”</h3><p>This single sentence exposes NameSilo’s role completely.</p><p><a href="https://www.fortinet.com">Fortinet</a> — a Fortune 500 cybersecurity company — classified xmrwallet.com as <strong>“Phishing.”</strong> This classification is used by firewalls, email gateways, and security appliances protecting <strong>700,000+ organizations worldwide</strong>.</p><p>The operator’s response: not to remove the phishing code — but to <strong>lobby VirusTotal to remove the detection</strong>.</p><p>And NameSilo presents this as a <em>positive development</em>. As evidence that the registrant is acting in good faith.</p><p>Read that again. A domain flagged as “Phishing” by Fortinet is trying to get the “Phishing” label removed — <strong>without removing the phishing code</strong>. And the registrar is cheering them on.</p><p>A legitimate site owner who was truly hacked would <em>welcome</em> VirusTotal detections — it validates the threat existed. They would focus on removing malicious code, not security warnings. This operator is doing the opposite: leaving the code intact, removing the warnings.</p><p><strong>NameSilo is actively assisting a flagged phishing domain in suppressing security alerts that protect potential victims.</strong> This isn’t abuse handling. This is a PR service for a criminal.</p><h3>LIE #6: “Are you able to confirm if the abuse is recent?”</h3><p>The abuse is current. The abuse is continuous. The abuse has never stopped in eight years.</p><p>But the framing of this question is the real tell. NameSilo is not asking because they want to investigate. They’re asking to <strong>shift the burden of proof</strong> to the reporter — so they can close the case if the answer doesn’t arrive fast enough.</p><p>The evidence was in the report. The VirusTotal detections are live. The victim reports span years. Three peer registrars reviewed the same evidence and acted. NameSilo is asking researchers to do their job for them — while they do the scammer’s PR.</p><h3>LIE #7: “We will re-open the investigation”</h3><p>“Re-open” implies it was once open. Based on the response, NameSilo’s “investigation” consisted of calling the scammer and writing down what he said. That’s not an investigation. That’s dictation.</p><p>An actual investigation would have included: a VirusTotal search (5 seconds), a Trustpilot check (1 minute), a Google search for “xmrwallet.com scam” (10 seconds), a read of the <a href="https://phishdestroy.github.io/DO-NOT-USE-xmrwallet-com/cache-issue35/">cached Issue #35</a> (10 minutes), and a basic check of the hosting infrastructure (IQWeb Belize + DDoS-Guard Russia for an “open-source” project?).</p><p>NameSilo did none of this. Or did all of it and is lying.</p><h3>Three registrars protected users. NameSilo became the scammer’s lawyer.</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QdpjBSeIIayXCRzz7Jygyw.png" /><figcaption>Neimsilo has taken in a Russian scammer who openly steals tens of thousands</figcaption></figure><p>The same evidence package was sent to all registrars:</p><p><strong>PublicDomainRegistry</strong> — xmrwallet.cc. Same operator (identical MX records mx1/mx2.privateemail.com, same WOT token 8a5554c915e3c17278a7, 23 file hashes on <a href="https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/xmrwallet.cc">VirusTotal</a>). <strong>Action: SUSPENDED.</strong> Days. No cover story. No call to the scammer.</p><p><strong>WebNic</strong> — xmrwallet.biz. Same infrastructure (AS59692, same DNS, same MX, same WOT token, 23 files on <a href="https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/xmrwallet.biz">VirusTotal</a>). <strong>Action: SUSPENDED.</strong> Days.</p><p><strong>NICENIC International</strong> — xmrwallet.net. Same IP as the already-suspended .biz (190.115.31.40). Ten-year prepaid registration. <strong>Action: DNS DEAD.</strong></p><p><strong>NameSilo</strong> — xmrwallet.com. The primary domain. Most documented. Most flagged. Most victims. Three peers already acted on identical evidence. <strong>Action: “The registrant is the victim. They’re working to get delisted from VT. Is the abuse recent?”</strong></p><p>Three companies in three countries — India, Malaysia, China — independently concluded: fraud. Suspend. One company — NameSilo, USA — concluded: the scammer is the victim, let’s help him remove the warnings.</p><h3>The victims NameSilo is helping the scammer hide from</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8vfagDTuOyZwJX3v44MNkA.png" /><figcaption>Neimsilo lies to the scammer and ignores the reports</figcaption></figure><blockquote>“I do deposit 590 monero 2 day gone and they steal it! Please ban this site and FBI need arest it!” — <a href="https://www.sitejabber.com/reviews/xmrwallet.com">Sitejabber</a>. <strong>590 XMR. ~$177,000.</strong></blockquote><blockquote>“My 17.44 XMR was all gone. I have both the TxID &amp; TX Key.” — <a href="https://www.trustpilot.com/review/www.xmrwallet.com">Trustpilot</a>.</blockquote><blockquote>“Create wallet — put 20 xmr next day 0 xmr — Scammers owner!” — <a href="https://www.sitejabber.com/reviews/xmrwallet.com">Sitejabber</a>.</blockquote><blockquote>“They stole $200 from me, leaving me high and dry.” — <a href="https://www.trustpilot.com/review/www.xmrwallet.com">Trustpilot</a>.</blockquote><blockquote>“Transferred to some other wallets instead of my mentioned wallet.” — <a href="https://www.trustpilot.com/review/www.xmrwallet.com">Trustpilot</a>.</blockquote><blockquote>“Whatever you do, do NOT try to use this wallet. UNABLE TO ACCESS MY FUNDS.” — <a href="https://www.trustpilot.com/review/www.xmrwallet.com">Trustpilot</a>.</blockquote><blockquote>“SCAMMERS! Lost contact when I wanted withdrawal, no response from customer support.” — Scam-Detector.</blockquote><p>These reports span <strong>years</strong>. The operator’s response to every victim — same template: <em>“You used a phishing clone.”</em> NameSilo’s response: <em>“The registrant is the victim.”</em></p><p>Conservative estimate: 10,000–50,000+ wallets created over 8 years. <strong>$1.5M–$15M+</strong> stolen at historical prices. Full victim documentation: <a href="https://phishdestroy.github.io/DO-NOT-USE-xmrwallet-com/">PhishDestroy investigation</a>.</p><h3>The escape domain panic — consciousness of guilt</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*NKcqSu9u44k6Y4WqBlxPoQ.png" /><figcaption>Neimsilo is not a registrar but an accomplice to a criminal</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Feb 4, 2026</strong> — xmrwallet.cc registered. 8yr prepaid. <em>Investigation not yet published.</em></p><p><strong>Feb 9</strong> — xmrwallet.biz registered. 5yr prepaid. <em>Still before publication.</em></p><p><strong>Feb 13</strong> — <a href="https://phishdestroy.github.io/DO-NOT-USE-xmrwallet-com/cache-issue35/">Issue #35</a> published. Full TX hijacking exposed.</p><p><strong>Feb 18</strong> — <a href="https://phishdestroy.github.io/DO-NOT-USE-xmrwallet-com/cache-issue36/">Issue #36</a> published. 109 requests, 43 viewkey transmissions.</p><p><strong>Feb 23</strong> — .cc SUSPENDED. .biz SUSPENDED. <strong>Same day:</strong> operator deletes Issues #35 + #36.</p><p><strong>Feb 26</strong> — xmrwallet.net registered (10yr, same IP as .biz). xmrwallet.me registered (10yr, same IP as .cc). Four registrars. Zero GitHub commits.</p><p><strong>Mar 8</strong> — xmrwallet.net DNS DEAD after <a href="https://phishdestroy.github.io/DO-NOT-USE-xmrwallet-com/">abuse report</a>.</p><p>Scoreboard: 3/4 escape domains neutralized. 23 years of prepaid registrations wasted. IP recycling proves same operator: .biz IP → reused by .net. .cc IP → reused by .me. All domains share identical NS (ddos-guard.net), MX (privateemail.com), and WOT token (8a5554c915e3c17278a7). <a href="https://phishdestroy.github.io/DO-NOT-USE-xmrwallet-com/">DNS maps and WHOIS evidence</a>.</p><p><strong>Does NameSilo believe “compromised” website owners register escape domains across 4 registrars, prepaid for decades, before the investigation is published?</strong></p><h3>The operator NameSilo calls “the victim”</h3><p><strong>Nathalie Roy</strong>, Canada. GitHub: <a href="https://github.com/nathroy">nathroy</a> (ID: 39167759). Reddit: u/WiseSolution — banned from r/Monero (2018). ProtonMail: royn5094@protonmail.com. Self-identified on xmrwallet.com/support.html. Full profile: <a href="https://phishdestroy.github.io/DO-NOT-USE-xmrwallet-com/posts/post-nathalie-roy-xmrwallet.html">PhishDestroy operator analysis</a>.</p><p>Claims “funded by donations” — zero donation wallet exists. Pays $550/month bulletproof hosting. 50+ paid SEO articles. DDoS-Guard CDN. Android app. 100+ blog posts in 10 languages. Hired a second developer for a custom captcha system in March 2026 — which was <a href="https://phishdestroy.github.io/DO-NOT-USE-xmrwallet-com/posts/post-xmrwallet-captcha-defeated.html">reverse-engineered and defeated within hours</a>.</p><p>NameSilo calls this person the victim of a compromise.</p><h3>The operator’s own words — emails to PhishDestroy</h3><p>After xmrwallet.com was reported, the operator (<strong>royn5094@protonmail.com</strong>) emailed <a href="https://phishdestroy.io">PhishDestroy</a> directly. Four emails over 7 days. Zero technical rebuttals. And one sentence that reveals everything about the relationship between the operator and NameSilo.</p><p><strong>Feb 16 — “We don’t store keys”</strong></p><blockquote>“We are an open source crypto wallet that is non-custodial, we don’t store seeds or keys, everything is done in your browser locally. Please remove your report on us, thank you. N.R.”</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*wmvkSP2MIN8GbBIy.png" /></figure><p>The same day, PhishDestroy responded with a full technical breakdown: raw_tx_and_hash.raw = 0 (client transaction discarded), session_key containing the victim&#39;s private view key in Base64, type == &#39;swept&#39; (custom theft marker absent from Monero protocol), production-only parameters not in the public GitHub repository. The operator never addressed a single finding.</p><p><strong>Feb 17 — Two emails in one day. Panic.</strong></p><blockquote>“This is the data we need to offer the service to users. This is not grounds for a domain suspension.”</blockquote><p>Yesterday: <em>“we don’t store keys.”</em> Today: <em>“this is the data we need.”</em> Two mutually exclusive statements in 24 hours.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*HssKQ2FaqSPfgrSF.png" /></figure><blockquote>“You are accusing without proof. The way the website was built does not verify anything was stolen, so I’m not sure what you’re going to waste your time on. If this is a legal matter, feel free to subpoena the domain registrar for my information to submit a complaint in the courts.”</blockquote><p><strong>Now read that last sentence again: “Feel free to subpoena the domain registrar.”</strong></p><p>This was written on Feb 17 — <em>before</em> we contacted NameSilo, <em>before</em> the abuse report was filed, and <em>before</em> NameSilo published their “compromise” cover story. At this point, nobody knew how NameSilo would respond.</p><p>And yet the operator is not worried. Not even slightly. A scammer running a phishing operation on bulletproof hosting behind DDoS-Guard should be <em>terrified</em> of a registrar investigation. A normal scammer would say “go ahead, try” — a bluff. But this operator doesn’t bluff. This operator <em>actively directs us toward the registrar</em>, as if confident that NameSilo will take his side.</p><p><strong>No scammer in history has ever said “please involve my registrar” — unless they already know the outcome.</strong></p><p>Why was the operator so confident? Was it just arrogance? Or does the operator have a relationship with someone at NameSilo — a friend in support, a remote contractor, a connection that guarantees protection? We don’t know. But the sequence of events speaks for itself:</p><p>1. Feb 17 — operator says “subpoena the registrar” with zero concern.</p><p>2. Feb 23 — three other registrars suspend his domains immediately.</p><p>3. NameSilo — the one registrar the operator pointed us toward — not only refuses to act, but publishes a defense calling him “the victim” and helps him remove VirusTotal warnings.</p><p>The operator predicted NameSilo’s response before it happened. That’s either the luckiest guess in the history of cybercrime — or the operator knew something we didn’t.</p><p><strong>Feb 18 — PhishDestroy responds with evidence and a warning.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*90gEoJf2yZNvHxNv.png" /></figure><p><strong>Feb 23 — Domains suspended. Operator panics.</strong></p><p>The same day xmrwallet.cc and xmrwallet.biz were <strong>SUSPENDED</strong> by their registrars, the operator’s tone changed completely:</p><blockquote>“I’ve communicated with my lawyer and you’ll hear from them directly soon for harassment, spamming and brand reputation damage. We’ve hired a private investigator to find your information to file the case.”</blockquote><blockquote>“You can literally look up Trezor, Ledger or any other major wallet, they all have complaints about stolen funds. Every single one of them. They also get their view keys to service users, that’s how it works.”</blockquote><p><strong>Trezor and Ledger are hardware wallets.</strong> They do not collect private view keys server-side. They don’t have PHP backends. They don’t transmit session_key to a server 40 times per session. The operator either doesn&#39;t understand cryptocurrency wallets — or is counting on the reader not understanding them.</p><p>Four emails. Zero explanations for session_key, raw = 0, swept, or the 5.3-year GitHub divergence. From &quot;please remove your report&quot; to &quot;my lawyer&quot; in 7 days. <strong>The lawyer has not materialized in 4 weeks.</strong></p><p><strong>But here’s the detail that destroys NameSilo’s entire “compromise” narrative:</strong></p><p>In all four emails (Feb 16–23), the operator speaks in first person — <em>“we are an open source wallet,”</em> <em>“this is how the website is run,”</em> <em>“this is the data we need.”</em> The operator defends the code, the architecture, the data collection — as their own work.</p><p><strong>Not once does the operator mention any hack, compromise, or unauthorized access.</strong></p><p>On Feb 16–17, the operator told us: “this is how the website is run.” Weeks later, NameSilo told the public: “the domain was compromised.” These two statements cannot both be true.</p><p>The “compromise” story didn’t exist until NameSilo contacted the operator and needed an explanation to close the case. The operator’s own emails — written before the cover story was needed — prove the “hack” narrative was <strong>fabricated after the fact</strong>.</p><p><strong>NameSilo received the same evidence — and the same operator emails. They chose the cover story over the evidence. They called this person “the victim.”</strong></p><h3>NameSilo’s liability: from negligence to complicity</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*BYRmefU5KZqGIjyWk7fBIA.png" /><figcaption>NameSilo hired and defended a known fraudster</figcaption></figure><p>Before NameSilo’s response, this was a case of registrar negligence — bad, but common. Abuse teams are slow. Things fall through cracks.</p><p><strong>After NameSilo’s response, this is something else entirely.</strong></p><p>NameSilo didn’t just fail to investigate. They:</p><p>1. <strong>Contacted the accused operator</strong> and accepted his version as fact.</p><p>2. <strong>Publicly declared the operator innocent</strong> — calling him the “victim” of a “compromise.”</p><p>3. <strong>Revealed they know the operator is lobbying to remove VirusTotal detections</strong> — and presented this as progress.</p><p>4. <strong>Published a cover story</strong> (“domain was compromised”) contradicted by 8 years of evidence.</p><p>5. <strong>Shifted the burden of proof</strong> to the reporters: “Is the abuse recent?”</p><p>This is not an abuse team dropping the ball. <strong>This is a registrar acting as the scammer’s press secretary.</strong></p><p>And if NameSilo is this committed to defending the operator — <strong>perhaps they should also be committed to making the victims whole.</strong></p><p>Under <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/approved-with-specs-2013-09-17-en">ICANN’s 2013 Registrar Accreditation Agreement (RAA), Section 3.18</a>, registrars must investigate and respond appropriately to abuse. NameSilo’s “appropriate response” was to write a press release defending the accused.</p><p>Three registrars — PublicDomainRegistry (India), WebNic (Malaysia), NICENIC (China) — in three countries, with three different legal frameworks, all independently concluded: <strong>fraud. Suspend.</strong> NameSilo concluded: <em>“the registrant is the victim.”</em></p><p>Every dollar stolen through xmrwallet.com <strong>after NameSilo published that statement</strong> was stolen by an operator that NameSilo publicly declared innocent. Every future victim can point to NameSilo’s words: <em>“Our team found evidence of the compromise not involving the registrant.”</em></p><p><strong>NameSilo cleared the operator. NameSilo endorsed the domain. NameSilo put it in writing.</strong></p><p>If those statements are wrong — and the evidence overwhelmingly proves they are — then NameSilo’s public endorsement directly contributed to every subsequent theft. The victims didn’t just lose money to a scammer. They lost money to a scammer <strong>whose registrar publicly vouched for him</strong>.</p><p><strong>With this level of commitment to acting as the operator’s defense attorney, NameSilo should be equally committed to covering the operator’s debts. If you vouch for a thief — you share the bill when he gets caught.</strong></p><h3>Take action</h3><p><strong>Report xmrwallet.com as phishing:</strong></p><p>→ <a href="https://safebrowsing.google.com/safebrowsing/report_phish/">Google Safe Browsing</a> — blocks in Chrome, Firefox, Safari, Edge</p><p>→ <a href="https://report.netcraft.com">Netcraft</a> — used by ISPs and registrars globally</p><p>→ <a href="https://phishtank.org/add_web_phish.php">PhishTank</a> — community blocklist</p><p>→ <a href="https://apwg.org/reportphishing/">APWG</a> — Anti-Phishing Working Group</p><p>→ <a href="https://phish.report/">Phish.Report</a> — auto-reports to 6+ platforms</p><p>→ abuse@namesilo.com — the registrar that calls it a “hack”</p><p><strong>File ICANN complaint against NameSilo:</strong></p><p>→ <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/complaint-2013-05-03-en">ICANN complaint form</a> — RAA Section 3.18 violation. Include NameSilo’s statement verbatim.</p><p><strong>Report to law enforcement</strong> (operator: Nathalie Roy, Canada):</p><p>→ <a href="https://www.antifraudcentre-centreantifraude.ca">Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre</a></p><p>→ <a href="https://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/en/contact-us">RCMP Cybercrime</a></p><p>→ <a href="https://ic3.gov">FBI IC3</a> (accepts international)</p><p>→ <a href="https://reportfraud.ftc.gov">FTC</a></p><p>→ <a href="https://www.europol.europa.eu/report-a-crime/report-cybercrime-online">Europol</a></p><p>→ <a href="https://www.interpol.int/Crimes/Cybercrime">Interpol</a></p><p><strong>Use safe wallets:</strong></p><p>→ <a href="https://getmonero.org/downloads">Monero GUI</a> — official, zero trackers</p><p>→ <a href="https://featherwallet.org">Feather Wallet</a> — Tor built-in, zero trackers</p><p>→ <a href="https://cakewallet.com">Cake Wallet</a> — iOS/Android, zero trackers</p><p>→ <a href="https://monerujo.io">Monerujo</a> — Android, zero trackers</p><p><strong>Never enter a private key or seed phrase into a website. Ever.</strong></p><h3>Full evidence — permanent, cached, verifiable</h3><p>→ <a href="https://phishdestroy.github.io/DO-NOT-USE-xmrwallet-com/">Full investigation — PhishDestroy</a></p><p>→ <a href="https://phishdestroy.github.io/DO-NOT-USE-xmrwallet-com/deleted.html">Deleted evidence archive</a></p><p>→ <a href="https://phishdestroy.github.io/DO-NOT-USE-xmrwallet-com/cache-issue35/">Issue #35 — cached HTML</a></p><p>→ <a href="https://phishdestroy.github.io/DO-NOT-USE-xmrwallet-com/cache-issue36/">Issue #36 — cached HTML</a></p><p>→ <a href="https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/www.xmrwallet.com">VirusTotal — xmrwallet.com</a></p><p>→ <a href="https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/xmrwallet.biz">VirusTotal — xmrwallet.biz</a></p><p>→ <a href="https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/xmrwallet.cc">VirusTotal — xmrwallet.cc</a></p><p>→ <a href="https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/xmrwallet.me">VirusTotal — xmrwallet.me</a></p><p>→ <a href="https://urlquery.net/report/a56ea134-19f0-467f-88c3-3444f5c49c06">URLQuery report</a></p><p>→ <a href="https://www.scamadviser.com/check-website/xmrwallet.com">ScamAdviser</a></p><p>→ <a href="https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5540097.0">BitcoinTalk warning thread</a></p><p>→ <a href="https://phishdestroy.github.io/DO-NOT-USE-xmrwallet-com/posts/post-xmrwallet-scam-exposed.html">Scam exposed — article</a></p><p>→ <a href="https://phishdestroy.github.io/DO-NOT-USE-xmrwallet-com/posts/post-xmrwallet-deleted-evidence.html">Deleted evidence — article</a></p><p>→ <a href="https://phishdestroy.github.io/DO-NOT-USE-xmrwallet-com/posts/post-is-xmrwallet-safe.html">Is xmrwallet safe? — article</a></p><p>→ <a href="https://phishdestroy.github.io/DO-NOT-USE-xmrwallet-com/posts/post-nathalie-roy-xmrwallet.html">Operator profile — article</a></p><p>→ <a href="https://phishdestroy.github.io/DO-NOT-USE-xmrwallet-com/posts/post-xmrwallet-captcha-defeated.html">Captcha defeated — article</a></p><p>→ <a href="https://phishdestroy.github.io/DO-NOT-USE-xmrwallet-com/posts/post-xmrwallet-alternatives.html">Safe alternatives — article</a></p><p>→ <a href="https://github.com/phishdestroy/DO-NOT-USE-xmrwallet-com">GitHub repository — full evidence</a></p><p>→ <a href="https://github.com/phishdestroy/destroylist">PhishDestroy blocklist — 100,000+ domains</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8x9gsv-0AmnBqI947cC6IQ.png" /><figcaption>I suggest that the victims ask Namesilo who will compensate them for their losses</figcaption></figure><p>NameSilo didn’t ignore the evidence. They read it, called the scammer, believed him, declared him innocent, and are helping him suppress security warnings. Then asked the researchers to prove the abuse is “recent.”</p><p><strong>That’s not negligence. That’s a partnership.</strong></p><p><a href="https://ghostarchive.org/archive/CXXZ0">NameSilo on X: &quot;@Phish_Destroy Our Abuse team conducted an in-depth review into this case and it seems that domain was compromised a few months ago (during which a copy of the webpage was replaced with a crypto-drainer). Prior to that, we had received no abuse reports related to this domain. After an extensive&quot; / X | Ghostarchive</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/645/1*Vccqwc5kQfdR00UnloQKzQ.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://ghostarchive.org/archive/CXXZ0">https://ghostarchive.org/archive/CXXZ0</a></figcaption></figure><p>Three registrars protected users. NameSilo protected the scammer — and put it in writing. Their statement will be Exhibit A in every filing from this point forward.</p><p><strong>If you vouch for the thief, you share his bill.</strong></p><p><em>Scammers delete evidence. Registrars write cover stories. We make it permanent.</em></p><p><a href="https://phishdestroy.io"><strong>PhishDestroy Research</strong></a> · <a href="https://t.me/destroy_phish">Telegram</a> · <a href="https://x.com/Phish_Destroy">Twitter/X</a> · <a href="https://t.me/PhishDestroy_bot">Bot</a> · <a href="https://api.destroy.tools">API</a></p><p>This investigation is based on publicly available evidence, live network captures, OSINT, public review platforms, and NameSilo’s own verbatim public statement. No unauthorized access was performed. All findings are independently reproducible using the archived data. NameSilo’s response is quoted in full, unedited.</p><p>If you are a victim of xmrwallet.com: document your TxID, wallet address, and date of loss. Report to <a href="https://ic3.gov">ic3.gov</a> and local law enforcement. Include NameSilo’s public statement in your filing. Do NOT pay “recovery services” — they are secondary scams.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2953f35b8a79" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[NiceNIC Exposed: The ICANN-Accredited Registrar Powering the World’s Cybercriminal Ecosystem]]></title>
            <link>https://phishdestroy.medium.com/nicenic-exposed-the-icann-accredited-registrar-powering-the-worlds-cybercriminal-ecosystem-4e4996452e03?source=rss-98b99bd0b2cb------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4e4996452e03</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[icann]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[osint]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nicenic]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybercrime]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[PhishDestroy]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 13 Jan 2026 04:47:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-07-25T18:14:39.799Z</atom:updated>
            <cc:license>https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/</cc:license>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>DNS Abuse Sanctuary: How NiceNIC (IANA 3765) Shields Global Cybercrime</strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*FPibYO9UKgFTJ24IyFNwow.jpeg" /><figcaption>A registrar that costs $10 will let you do whatever you want and will ignore and laugh at any legal request.</figcaption></figure><p>The modern internet, often perceived by the lay public as an ethereal cloud of information, is in reality a rigidly structured hierarchy of physical infrastructure, administrative governance, and contractual trust. At the gateway of this digital ecosystem stand domain registrars — the entities authorized by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) to lease the human-readable addresses that serve as the storefronts, communication hubs, and identity cards of the web. These gatekeepers are bound by the Registrar Accreditation Agreement (RAA) to maintain the stability and security of the Domain Name System (DNS). However, a distinct subset of accredited entities has emerged that weaponizes this agreement, subverting their custodial duties to create safe havens for illicit activity.</p><p>This comprehensive investigative report isolates and analyzes the operations of one such entity: <strong>NiceNIC International Group Co., Limited (IANA ID 3765)</strong>.</p><p>Headquartered in Hong Kong, NiceNIC has statistically and operationally distinguished itself not through innovation or market dominance, but through an anomalous and sustained concentration of abuse. This dossier, synthesized from proprietary intelligence gathered by the PhishDestroy Threat Intelligence Team, alongside data from the DNS Research Federation (DNSRF), Spamhaus, and the Cybercrime Information Center, establishes that NiceNIC functions as a structural pillar of the modern cybercriminal economy.</p><p>Our investigation reveals a distinct operational pattern that transcends mere negligence. NiceNIC exhibits the characteristics of a “Bulletproof Registrar,” characterized by:</p><ol><li><strong>Marketing of Anonymity:</strong> The explicit prioritization of cryptocurrency payments (USDT, BTC) to sever financial audibility.</li><li><strong>Procedural Obstructionism:</strong> The utilization of a “closed-loop” abuse reporting system designed to obfuscate responsibility and delay mitigation.</li><li><strong>Geopolitical Arbitrage:</strong> The exploitation of jurisdictional friction between Western law enforcement and Hong Kong corporate law.</li><li><strong>Statistical Dominance in Crime:</strong> A phishing domain score <strong>326 times higher</strong> than the industry standard.</li></ol><p>The implications of these findings are severe. By providing “full-stack” protection — acting as both registrar and host for high-profile threat actors like Scattered Spider and the perpetrators of the December 2025 Trust Wallet heist — NiceNIC has effectively positioned itself as an open advertisement for global cybercrime. This report serves as a formal indictment of IANA 3765’s operational model, arguing that its continued accreditation constitutes a material breach of public trust and a direct threat to the stability of the global internet.</p><h3>Part I: The Infrastructure of Malice and the PhishDestroy Methodology</h3><p>To understand the gravity of the findings presented in this dossier, it is essential to first establish the methodological rigor applied to the data collection. In an industry often clouded by false positives and automated noise, the attribution of “rogue” status requires a standard of evidence that withstands forensic scrutiny.</p><h3>1.1 The PhishDestroy Protocol: Precision Intelligence</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*aMsDbftVW-D4D8KtHYwUPw.png" /><figcaption>False-positive statistics are <strong>no more than 1–2 per 1,000 valid detections</strong></figcaption></figure><p>The intelligence underpinning this report is derived from the PhishDestroy Threat Intelligence Team, an independent analytical platform dedicated to the detection and disruption of malicious infrastructure. Unlike traditional abuse reporting, which can be prone to “spammy” automated submissions, PhishDestroy employs a multi-stage, forensic-based methodology designed to isolate high-fidelity threats.</p><p><strong>GitHub Destroylis</strong>t: <a href="https://github.com/phishdestroy/destroylist">https://github.com/phishdestroy/destroylist</a></p><p><strong>Live Threat Map</strong>: <a href="https://phishdestroy.io/live/">https://phishdestroy.io/live/</a></p><p>Our model is fully <strong>active and pre-emptive</strong>: we aim to eliminate phishing <strong>before it causes damage</strong>. We operate transparently, maintain a live open database, share data with multiple security systems, and have <strong>no profit motive</strong> — no donations, no commercial interest, no bias toward or against <a href="https://www.nicenic-abuse.blog/">https://www.nicenic-abuse.blog/</a>any registrar. Our only goal is the destruction of phishing.</p><p>We run <strong>30+ proprietary parsers</strong> that detect threats at the earliest stage through malvertising monitoring, SEO-abuse tracking, social-media campaign analysis, typosquatting detection, and community intelligence. Confirmed threats are immediately distributed to <strong>50+ major vendors</strong> (Google Safe Browsing, Cloudflare, Microsoft, VirusTotal, etc.) for global remediation.</p><p><strong>Key Technical Signatures Monitored:</strong></p><ul><li><strong>Cryptocurrency </strong><a href="https://radar.securityalliance.org/2025-10-drainers-vol-1/"><strong>Drainers</strong></a><strong>:</strong> JavaScript snippets designed to interact with Web3 wallets (e.g., MetaMask, Trust Wallet) and execute unauthorized transaction signatures.</li><li><strong>Phishing Templates:</strong> HTML and CSS structures that replicate the login interfaces of major financial institutions, specifically looking for obfuscated code or “homograph” deceptions.</li><li><strong>Malicious JavaScript:</strong> Obfuscated code blocks commonly associated with drive-by downloads or credential harvesting.</li></ul><h3>Each report contains a full evidence package, including:</h3><p>• the complete email,<br> • the PDF report,<br> • the inline screenshot,<br> • the direct-link screenshot,<br> • and the attached screenshot file.</p><p>We provide this structure to ensure maximum clarity for the abuse team and to simplify verification based on VirusTotal verdicts and other technical indicators.</p><p>If a repeated notice is required, we include additional details and an expanded technical analysis.</p><p>We operate under a strict notification system to avoid any accusations of flooding. Every report is based on live, confirmed detection of the threat.</p><h4>Initial Takedown Notice (1st Notice)</h4><p>The first notification includes:<br> • the email,<br> • the forensic PDF,<br> • all screenshots (inline, link, attached).</p><p><strong>Examples:</strong><br> • <a href="https://phishdestroy.io/1st">First email (Initial Notice)</a><br> • <a href="https://phishdestroy.io/nicenic/Phishing_Report_caivax.com.pdf">PDF report (caivax.com)</a></p><h4>Escalation Report (2nd Notice)</h4><p>A repeated notification is sent <strong>only</strong> when our parsers or repeated user signals confirm that the threat has been detected again and remains active.<br> If neither the system nor human analysts detect the site anymore, reporting stops immediately.<br> This ensures that escalation is issued only for genuinely active and dangerous incidents that continue to spread.</p><p>The escalation package includes:<br> • the updated email,<br> • the escalation PDF,<br> • all screenshots (inline, link, attached).</p><p><strong>Examples:</strong><br> • <a href="https://phishdestroy.io/not1">Second email (Escalation Notice)</a><br> • <a href="https://phishdestroy.io/nicenic/PhishDestroy_Escalation_bigspin_cc_17.pdf">Escalation PDF (bigspin.cc) — Report #17 for a domain ignored for more than 1300 hours.</a></p><h3>Part II: The Data of Distrust — Statistical Evidence</h3><p>Anecdotal evidence of abuse is common across the registrar industry; even giants like GoDaddy or Namecheap host thousands of malicious domains simply due to their immense market share. However, the <em>rate</em> and <em>concentration</em> of abuse distinguish a negligent registrar from a rogue one. The data regarding NiceNIC is unambiguous and statistically catastrophic.</p><h3>2.1 The League Tables of Internet Neighborhoods</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*uP4Ye7VZYjLIaRqzINWI_g.png" /><figcaption>Absolute champions in terms of the amount of malicious infrastructure over several years</figcaption></figure><p>The concept of “Internet Neighborhoods” posits that just as physical cities have safe zones and high-crime zones, the internet is divided into Top-Level Domains (TLDs) and registrars that are either safe or dangerous. The DNS Research Federation (DNSRF) and other watchdogs track these neighborhoods quantitatively to assess the health of the ecosystem.</p><p>In the 2024–2025 reporting periods, NiceNIC consistently appeared in the upper echelons of the DNSRF’s “League Tables” for abuse. The report highlighted a cluster of high-abuse registrars in the Asia region, specifically identifying NiceNIC as part of an “unsafe neighborhood” comparable to a “lawless Wild West.” This ranking is critical because it normalizes for size. It is not merely that NiceNIC has a high volume of bad domains; it is that a disproportionately high percentage of its total business is toxic.1</p><h3>2.2 The Phishing Landscape 2025: A Statistical Anomaly</h3><p>The most damning statistical evidence comes from the “The Phishing Landscape 2025” report by the Cybercrime Information Center. This report utilizes a “Phishing Domain Score” to quantify the density of threats. The discrepancy between NiceNIC and legitimate providers effectively illustrates the “rogue” categorization.</p><p><a href="https://interisle.net/insights/phishing-landscape-2025-an-annual-study-of-the-scope-and-distribution-of-phishing">https://interisle.net/insights/phishing-landscape-2025-an-annual-study-of-the-scope-and-distribution-of-phishing</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/760/0*5KOk4I6cue7Qs2zW.png" /><figcaption>Original <a href="https://interisle.net/insights/phishing-landscape-2025-an-annual-study-of-the-scope-and-distribution-of-phishing">https://interisle.net/insights/phishing-landscape-2025-an-annual-study-of-the-scope-and-distribution-of-phishing</a></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.cybercrimeinfocenter.org/phishing-activity-in-registrars-august-october-2025">Phishing Activity in Domain Registrars, August 1, 2025 - October 31, 2025 - Cybercrime Information Center</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2RicC33OJLZDKFYNVxY0Gg.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.cybercrimeinfocenter.org/phishing-activity-in-registrars-august-october-2025">https://www.cybercrimeinfocenter.org/phishing-activity-in-registrars-august-october-2025</a></figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Y0h4iAIuAE4vx-n8LxVZzg.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.cybercrimeinfocenter.org/phishing-activity-in-registrars-august-october-2025">https://www.cybercrimeinfocenter.org/phishing-activity-in-registrars-august-october-2025</a></figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ciPGhmGVFYom_yAncc_g9Q.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.cybercrimeinfocenter.org/phishing-activity-in-registrars-august-october-2025">https://www.cybercrimeinfocenter.org/phishing-activity-in-registrars-august-october-2025</a></figcaption></figure><p>According to the <em>Phishing Activity Quarter-Over-Quarter (Aug–Oct 2025)</em> report, NiceNIC shows a consistent upward trend in phishing domain volume, while most major registrars are tightening controls and reducing abuse. This divergence is not accidental. As other registrars harden their abuse processes, malicious actors naturally migrate toward the registrar that ignores takedowns and leaves phishing domains online the longest.</p><p>The result is structural, not incidental: NiceNIC’s customer base is increasingly composed of threat actors because the registrar’s policies make it the most attractive option for abuse. This growth pattern reflects deliberate operational permissiveness rather than lack of capacity or oversight.</p><p>Source: <a href="https://www.cybercrimeinfocenter.org/phishing-activity-quarter-over-quarter-registrars-august-october-2025?utm_source=chatgpt.com">https://www.cybercrimeinfocenter.org/phishing-activity-quarter-over-quarter-registrars-august-october-2025</a></p><p><strong>Registrar Phishing Domain Score StatusN iceNIC (IANA 3765)1,141.74 Critical Threat<br></strong>Google / GoDaddy3.2–3.5 Industry Standard Namecheap~3.5 Industry Standard</p><p>Analysis of the Metric:</p><p>NiceNIC’s score is approximately 326 times higher than the industry standard. This is a statistical anomaly so vast that it cannot be explained by accident, resource constraints, or incompetence. In statistical modeling, such a deviation usually indicates a structural variable — in this case, a business model that actively courts malicious actors. While a registrar like Namecheap may process more total abuse reports due to having millions more domains, they act on them. NiceNIC, despite a smaller portfolio, maintains one of the highest densities of malicious domains per 10,000 registrations in the entire industry.</p><h3>2.3 Spamhaus Reputation Metrics</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*h6bXVJfBnEbbydQjxWM-9w.png" /><figcaption>NiceNIC, led by Hugo Julian, is striving to become the best among the worst.</figcaption></figure><p><a href="http://spamhaus.org">Spamhaus </a>is widely regarded as the most authoritative arbiter of reputation in the email and network security space. Their “World’s Most Abused Domain Registrars” list serves as a barometer for registrar health.</p><ul><li><strong>Global Ranking:</strong> NiceNIC has consistently ranked among the top 10 most abused registrars globally. In Q4 2022 and continuing through 2025, their presence on this list has been durable.</li><li><strong>The “Badness” Index:</strong> Spamhaus calculates a “badness index” that weighs not just the number of malicious domains, but the duration they remain active after being reported. A high score on this index indicates systematic failure. NiceNIC’s score of <strong>6.03</strong> places it in the company of the world’s worst offenders, far outstripping reputable competitors.</li></ul><p><a href="https://www.spamhaus.org/reputation-statistics/">The Spamhaus Project</a></p><p><a href="https://www.spamhaus.org/resource-hub/domain-reputation/domain-reputation-update-april-september-2025/">https://www.spamhaus.org/resource-hub/domain-reputation/domain-reputation-update-april-september-2025/</a></p><h3>Part III: Mechanisms of Evasion — The “Bulletproof” Model</h3><p>How does a registrar achieve such notoriety? It requires a combination of technical permissiveness, procedural obstruction, and policy exploitation. Our analysis reveals that NiceNIC has constructed a “closed loop” ecosystem designed to shield its clients from the consequences of their actions.</p><h3>3.1 The “Closed Loop” Abuse System</h3><p>The Registrar Accreditation Agreement (RAA) requires registrars to maintain an abuse contact and investigate reports. NiceNIC complies with the <em>form</em> of this requirement while completely gutting its <em>substance</em>. Security researchers and victims reporting abuse to abuse@nicenic.net describe a Kafkaesque experience designed to fatigue the reporter.</p><p>The Auto-Responder Wall:</p><p>Upon submitting a detailed forensic report, the reporter receives a generic acknowledgement template:</p><blockquote>Dear Reporter,</blockquote><blockquote>Thank you for submitting your report. We have received your message and appreciate the effort to keep the Internet safe.</blockquote><blockquote>However at this stage the information provided is not sufficient for our team to verify the issue or to determine the nature of the reported activity. Reports we receive may involve many different categories including DNS abuse content related matters commercial disputes impersonation fraud allegations intellectual property claims or other types of online misuse. For each category we are required to review the evidence based on the policies of ICANN registries and applicable laws.</blockquote><blockquote>To proceed with a proper review we kindly ask you to provide clear and verifiable evidence that directly shows the issue you are reporting. Useful information includes full URLs of the specific webpages involved screenshots that clearly show the content the domain name and the URL visible in the browser the date and time of observation technical indicators such as mail headers server responses or scan results when applicable and any explanation of how the reported activity relates to the harm described in the complaint.</blockquote><blockquote>Please note that registrars are required to distinguish between DNS level abuse and matters related to general website content business disputes or the legality of products or services. Some categories must be handled by the website operator the hosting provider the merchant platform the payment processor or the appropriate law enforcement agency rather than at the domain level. We will review the evidence you provide and take the appropriate action based on the policies that apply.</blockquote><blockquote>As soon as we receive clear supporting evidence our abuse team will reopen the case immediately and conduct a full review in line with ICANN requirements and registry rules.</blockquote><blockquote>Thank you for your understanding and cooperation.</blockquote><blockquote><em>Best regards,<br>NiceNIC Abuse Team<br>ICANN </em><strong><em>Accredited Registrar since 2012</em></strong><em><br>Domains | Reseller API | Business Email | SSL Certificates | Servers</em></blockquote><p>This template is sent even when the initial report contains exactly the requested data — URLs, screenshots, and server logs. It is a delay tactic.</p><p>The Forwarding Game:</p><p>Instead of investigating the evidence — for example, a URL clearly hosting a fake login page — NiceNIC forwards the complaint to the registrant (the criminal). The criminal registrant then replies denying the abuse, or simply ignores it. If they deny it, NiceNIC often accepts this denial at face value and closes the ticket, stating, “We have received a response from the customer denying the allegations.”</p><p>This “closed loop” allows NiceNIC to claim they are “processing” reports, thereby satisfying ICANN auditors, while ensuring that no action is actually taken to disrupt the revenue-generating customer. It is a bureaucratic firewall designed to protect malicious infrastructure.1</p><h3>3.2 Marketing Anonymity: The Crypto-Currency Nexus</h3><p>In the context of legitimate global business, cryptocurrency payments are a niche convenience. In the context of cybercrime, they are an operational necessity. Traditional payment methods, such as credit cards or wire transfers, require a bank account, which in turn requires Know Your Customer (KYC) verification. This creates a financial paper trail that law enforcement can use to de-anonymize perpetrators.</p><p>NiceNIC explicitly markets its acceptance of <strong>Bitcoin (BTC), Tether (USDT), Ethereum (ETH), and Litecoin (LTC)</strong> for domain registration and renewals. By prioritizing and advertising these payment methods, NiceNIC signals to the market: <em>We do not want to know who you are.</em> This severance of the financial link between the criminal and the infrastructure is a critical service feature. It transforms the registrar from a service provider into an anonymity broker, protecting the identity of its clients even as they engage in demonstrable fraud.</p><h3>3.3 Technical Forensics: Homograph Attacks and DGAs</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*stfi58LVUYsxVIg-Armbxg.png" /><figcaption>NiceNIC’s ambition extends beyond phishing — they want to dominate every criminal vector, including malware distribution, botnets, and lockers, positioning themselves as the leading hub for large-scale abuse.</figcaption></figure><p>NiceNIC’s infrastructure is optimized for specific technical attack vectors that require permissive registration policies.</p><p>Homograph Attacks and Faux Cyrillic:</p><p>The Domain Name System allows for Internationalized Domain Names (IDNs), enabling scripts like Cyrillic, Arabic, or Chinese. Threat actors exploit this via “homograph attacks,” where characters that look identical to Latin letters are used to spoof brands (e.g., using a Cyrillic ‘a’ to spoof amazon.com). While rigorous registrars implement policies to flag “confusable” registrations, NiceNIC’s automated systems are a playground for these attacks. Researchers have identified “Faux Cyrillic” clusters within NiceNIC’s zone, utilizing lookalike characters to deceive users.</p><p>Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs):</p><p>Google Threat Intelligence has flagged the presence of “recently created DGA domains” within NiceNIC’s portfolio. Malware infected on victim computers generates thousands of random domain names (e.g., x8d9f2a1.com) to contact a Command &amp; Control (C2) server. The presence of high-volume DGA registrations indicates that NiceNIC is being used to manage botnets. This implies an API that allows for rapid, bulk registration without effective rate limiting or pattern detection — features that NiceNIC effectively provides.</p><h3>Part IV: Case Studies in Cybercrime</h3><p>The abstract statistics of abuse translate into concrete financial and psychological devastation for victims. The following case studies highlight NiceNIC’s role in high-stakes cybercrime events, demonstrating the real-world impact of their operational policies.</p><h3>4.1 Case Study: The Trust Wallet Heist (December 2025)</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*cZMna8iRW1BpCpcLcsu9Lw.png" /><figcaption><em>NiceNIC is a malicious actor who openly ignores abuse reports and positions himself as a protector for scammers, harming the reputation of the global ecosystem — including his own country.</em></figcaption></figure><p>In December 2025, the cryptocurrency ecosystem was destabilized by a sophisticated attack targeting users of Trust Wallet, a popular non-custodial crypto wallet. This incident serves as a definitive case study in registrar complicity, moving beyond passive negligence into active facilitation.</p><p>The Attack Vector:</p><p>Threat actors distributed a malicious browser extension, likely through a compromised supply chain or sophisticated social engineering. This malware was designed to harvest “seed phrases” — the master keys to user wallets. Once a seed phrase is compromised, the attacker has total control over the funds.</p><p>The NiceNIC Connection: Full-Stack Control:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/870/1*0Pd5yx7x4SNDuFwD5-M0Vw.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://slowmist.medium.com/christmas-heist-analysis-of-trust-wallet-browser-extension-hack-bdb35c3cc6dd">https://slowmist.medium.com/christmas-heist-analysis-of-trust-wallet-browser-extension-hack-bdb35c3cc6dd</a> domain confirmed</figcaption></figure><p>To monetize the attack, the stolen seed phrases needed to be exfiltrated from victim computers to the attackers. The malware communicated with a specific “data-exfiltration infrastructure” to upload the stolen keys. Forensic analysis confirmed that this critical infrastructure was not only registered via NiceNIC but also hosted on NiceNIC servers. This “full-stack” control meant NiceNIC had absolute technical sovereignty over the exfiltration nodes.</p><p>The Operational Failure:</p><p>Trust Wallet’s security team and independent researchers identified the malicious domains and contacted NiceNIC immediately. Intelligence indicates that the NiceNIC operator was active on Telegram (visible status “Online”) during the heist, receiving urgent alerts from PhishDestroy and other researchers. But most likely, the NiceNIC operators were actively helping their client mitigate the DDoS attack, ensuring the client stayed satisfied with their service.</p><p>Despite the real-time notification of a massive financial crime in progress, the infrastructure remained live. The delay was catastrophic. In a digital heist, seconds matter. The fact that the infrastructure was up and running long enough to exfiltrate the keys represents a critical failure of the registrar’s duty. The theft reached an estimated <strong>$8.5 million</strong> in drained assets. The “insufficient evidence” auto-responders provided the attackers with the time they needed to complete the theft and launder the funds.</p><p><em>https://trustwallet.com/blog/announcements/trust-wallet-browser-extension-v268-incident-community-update — Trust Wallet Browser Extension v2.68 Incident Community Update</em></p><h3>4.2 Case Study: The “Soulless” Scam Machine (August 2025)</h3><p>In August 2025, investigative journalist <a href="https://krebsonsecurity.com/2025/08/affiliates-flock-to-soulless-scam-gambling-machine/">Brian Krebs</a> exposed a massive network of Russian scam gambling sites, dubbed the “Soulless” machine. This network represents the industrialization of fraud, where automation is used to deploy thousands of identical scam sites.</p><p><a href="https://gist.githubusercontent.com/phishdestroy/ce7890352e7277c5fa112670473c2fe2/raw/ad494ba6f6dd4e02bfe0689320f5bc89e6130d55/gistfile1.txt">list of sites</a></p><p>The Scale of the Network:</p><p>PhishDestroy intelligence identified over 1,200 identical sites sharing the same code base, the same crypto-drainer scripts, and the same visual structure. The vast majority of these clones were registered through NiceNIC. It is statistically impossible for a diligent abuse team to miss a pattern of 1,200 identical websites appearing in their zone files simultaneously.</p><p>Symbiosis with Crime Panels:</p><p>The relationship between the scammers and the registrar appears to be symbiotic. Owners of scam panels, such as the “Gambler Panel,” actively train their affiliates to use NiceNIC. Leaked Telegram screenshots reveal instructors explicitly recommending NiceNIC as a “safe haven.” These instructions guide affiliates on how to format their responses to NiceNIC’s forwarded complaints to ensure the domains remain active.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*5U2f1_DU5uu9xkhP.png" /><figcaption>A fraudulent Russian group recommends using the “best provider,” NICENIC, and lifting bans through Telegram. Source: t.me/gambler_tech/39 <em>Scammers who target every country, including the CIS, Hong Kong, and even their own people.</em></figcaption></figure><p>This case demonstrates that NiceNIC is not merely a service provider; it is a preferred partner in the supply chain of industrialized fraud. The “Soulless” network relies on NiceNIC’s lethargy to maintain its uptime.1</p><h3>4.3 Case Study: Scattered Spider (UNC3944)</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/927/1*jAwfDkLDd16fGnSY94i44w.png" /><figcaption>Scattered Spider: The Supply Chain of Ransomware</figcaption></figure><p>Scattered Spider is one of the most aggressive threat groups currently operating, known for targeting identity providers like Okta to breach major corporations (e.g., MGM Resorts, Caesars Entertainment).</p><p>The Lookalike Tactic:</p><p>The group relies heavily on “lookalike” domains — domains that visually resemble corporate login portals (e.g., okta-support-update.com). Intelligence from Mimecast, Google Threat Intelligence, and Silent Push has linked a significant number of domains used in these campaigns to NiceNIC.</p><p>The Operational Requirement:</p><p>Scattered Spider is a financially motivated group that relies on social engineering. They know that corporate security teams (Blue Teams) monitor for lookalike domains. To succeed, they need a registrar that is slow to react. If a Blue Team reports a domain and it is taken down in 30 minutes (a standard for reputable registrars), the attack fails. If it stays up for 48 hours — the typical “ignore” window of NiceNIC — the attack succeeds, and the group gains entry to the corporate network. NiceNIC is effectively part of the supply chain for ransomware attacks against Fortune 500 companies.</p><p><a href="https://www.silentpush.com/blog/scattered-spider-2025/">Scattered Spider: Still Hunting for Victims in 2025</a></p><p><em>https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1015/</em></p><h3>Part V: The Manifesto and the PR Stunt</h3><p>On January 10, 2026, the implicit actions of NiceNIC were made explicit in a bizarre public incident. The official NiceNIC X (Twitter) account posted a message that abandoned all pretense of corporate compliance:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/607/0*uWrYXYKso7QuM5Oz.jpg" /><figcaption>They posted it — or someone using their official Twitter account did — and they even managed to include a mistake.</figcaption></figure><blockquote>“We are not against scamming the whole world… we here to make cash.”</blockquote><p>What this really looks like is not an apology or an explanation for the public — it’s PR aimed at the hackers themselves. A signal: <em>“We’re on your side, we don’t block scams, we don’t cooperate with ICANN, we don’t care about reports. We’re the registrar you can rely on.”</em></p><p>And the “Russian hacker” angle fits perfectly into that strategy. By inserting a Cyrillic letter, they create a ready-made excuse: <em>“This wasn’t us, this was Russian attackers posting from our account.”</em> It gives them a clean separation — <em>we’re Chinese, we don’t think like that, look, there’s even a Russian character in the message.</em></p><p>In reality, it looks far more like an intentional move: a performance designed both to curry favor with scammers and to provide a convenient alibi if anyone questions why their official account is openly endorsing criminal activity.</p><h3>Part VI: Geopolitics and Regulatory Inertia</h3><p>If NiceNIC is so visibly complicit, why does it retain its accreditation? The answer lies in the structural weaknesses of ICANN’s enforcement model and the specific legal loopholes NiceNIC exploits.</p><h3>6.1 The “Notice and Cure” Loophole</h3><p>The RAA contains enforcement mechanisms, but they are designed primarily for contract compliance (e.g., paying fees, keeping data escrowed), not crime prevention. When ICANN receives a complaint about a registrar, they issue a “Notice of Breach.” The registrar then has a specific period (usually 15 days) to “cure” the breach.</p><p>NiceNIC games this system effectively. If ICANN sends a notice regarding 50 specific domains, NiceNIC can simply delete those 50 domains on Day 14. ICANN then declares the breach “cured.” Meanwhile, NiceNIC has registered 5,000 new malicious domains. This “Whac-A-Mole” dynamic allows the registrar to be perpetually in breach and perpetually “curing” it, without ever fundamentally changing its business practices.</p><h3>6.2 The Hong Kong Shield</h3><p>NiceNIC’s Hong Kong jurisdiction is a critical component of its “bulletproof” status. While Hong Kong maintains a Common Law system, the geopolitical friction between the US/Europe and China/Hong Kong has increased significantly.</p><p>Western law enforcement agencies (FBI, Europol) face significant bureaucratic hurdles when serving subpoenas or takedown orders in Hong Kong. The era of seamless cooperation has eroded. Furthermore, local priorities differ. The Great Firewall of China is obsessed with internal political stability; content that criticizes the CCP is taken down in seconds. However, a phishing site targeting a French bank or a US crypto wallet is not a priority for local censors. NiceNIC exploits this asymmetry: they comply with local political red lines while allowing the “Wild West” to reign for international financial crime.</p><p><em>https://www.hkirc.hk/en/accredited-registrars</em></p><h3>Conclusion: A Rogue State in the DNS</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*tXRIsSPVi9PyAl67zq3qHw.png" /><figcaption>In the modern ecosystem, no registrar should be willing to protect scam syndicates for the sake of earning $10 per domain. Out of more than 500,000 domains we’ve processed, NiceNIC is the <strong>only</strong> registrar we’ve encountered that operates with such a stance.</figcaption></figure><p>The evidence compiled in this report leads to a singular conclusion: NiceNIC (IANA 3765) is a rogue registrar. It does not operate within the spirit of the ICANN community; it operates as a parasite upon it.</p><ul><li><strong>Statistical Outlier:</strong> Its abuse rates are not accidental; they are structural, exceeding industry norms by over 300%.</li><li><strong>Operational Complicity:</strong> Its “closed loop” abuse process and crypto-anonymity are features designed to protect criminals.</li><li><strong>Proven Harm:</strong> It facilitates high-end cyberwarfare (Scattered Spider) and mass-market fraud (Trust Wallet).</li></ul><p>The title of this report asserts that NiceNIC is “Openly Advertising” for cybercrime. This advertisement is not a billboard. It is a signal sent through every ignored abuse report, every crypto transaction, and every day a phishing site remains live when it should have been dead. The criminal underground hears this signal loud and clear.</p><p><em>Before any remediation steps, it is strongly recommended to review the ICANN policies that NiceNIC constantly references in their automated replies. Their default response — claiming “insufficient evidence” — is absurd, given that all investigative work is already completed for them and the evidence provided far exceeds the requirements outlined in ICANN’s own abuse-handling rules. Their auto-reply effectively mocks ICANN and every registrar that actually follows compliance standards.</em></p><p><strong>Hiding behind ‘free speech’ to justify refusing takedowns, while calling automated replies an ‘abuse desk,’ isn’t just dishonest — it’s criminal. It’s a bargain-bin excuse for aiding offenders, shielding their infrastructure, and undermining every attempt at investigation</strong></p><h3>Recommendations for Remediation</h3><ol><li><strong>Immediate ICANN Audit:</strong> ICANN must invoke its audit rights under the RAA to examine NiceNIC’s abuse handling records and crypto-payment KYC procedures. The audit should specifically focus on the discrepancy between the volume of abuse reports received and the volume of domains suspended.</li><li><strong>Invocation of RAA Section 3.11.3:</strong> The security community must build a case that NiceNIC’s continued accreditation poses a threat to the stability and security of the internet. Section 3.11.3 allows for termination if the registrar’s misconduct “materially harmed consumers or the public interest.” The $8.5 million Trust Wallet theft constitutes material harm.</li><li><strong>Financial Sanctions and Payment Rails:</strong> If the registrar cannot be shamed, the payment rails must be severed. However, their reliance on crypto makes this difficult, underscoring the need for regulatory action at the accreditation level. Pressure should be applied to upstream registries (Verisign for.com, PIR for.org) to de-peer NiceNIC if they continue to violate abuse policies.</li></ol><p>Until IANA 3765 is revoked, the internet’s “Red Light District” will remain open for business, and the victims will continue to pile up.</p><p><strong>Thanks for reading! 🙏<br> Stay alert when you come across a domain registered via NiceNIC 🚨<br> Don’t act like NiceNIC — act responsibly 👍<br> Together, we can push phishing and scam out of the internet 🌐✨</strong></p><p><strong>Further reading / references:</strong><br><em> 🔗 </em><a href="https://www.trustpilot.com/review/nicenic.net?utm_source=chatgpt.com"><em>https://www.trustpilot.com/review/nicenic.net</em></a><em> — Trustpilot user reviews on abuse handling and phishing domains. <br> 🔗 </em><a href="https://www.nicenic-abuse.blog/"><em>https://nicenic.support/</em></a><em> — Independent write-up on NiceNIC abuse reporting process and ICANN compliance issues. <br> 🔗 </em><a href="https://dev.to/destroyphish/the-backbone-of-global-scam-how-namesilo-webnic-and-nicenic-1if1?utm_source=chatgpt.com"><em>https://dev.to/destroyphish/the-backbone-of-global-scam-how-namesilo-webnic-and-nicenic-1if1</em></a><em> — OSINT analysis of registrars enabling scams. <br> 🔗 </em><a href="https://www.cybercrimeinfocenter.org/phishing-activity-in-registrars-may-july-2025?utm_source=chatgpt.com"><em>https://www.cybercrimeinfocenter.org/phishing-activity-in-registrars-may-july-2025</em></a><em> — Registrar phishing domain ranking (includes NiceNIC). <br> 🔗 </em><a href="https://interisle.substack.com/p/phishing-trends-february-april-2025?utm_source=chatgpt.com"><em>https://interisle.substack.com/p/phishing-trends-february-april-2025</em></a><em> — Phishing activity analysis showing registrars with high phishing domain counts.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4e4996452e03" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[DestroyScammers Dashboard: Exposing Crypto Scammers and Helping Victims Fight Back]]></title>
            <link>https://phishdestroy.medium.com/destroyscammers-dashboard-exposing-crypto-scammers-and-helping-victims-fight-back-c72add5971a5?source=rss-98b99bd0b2cb------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c72add5971a5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[scam]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[phishing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[osint]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[PhishDestroy]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 30 Nov 2025 03:55:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-11-30T03:55:55.476Z</atom:updated>
            <cc:license>https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/</cc:license>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*cmqQVAB2XRX8JOFP" /><figcaption>For many victims, this is how it starts: one screen, a zeroed balance, and the feeling that everything is gone for good.</figcaption></figure><p>Maybe it was a fake airdrop. Maybe it was a “support chat” that walked you step by step into sending everything. Maybe it was a drainer hidden behind a trusted brand or a media personality.</p><p>However it happened, the result often feels the same:</p><ul><li>Money gone.</li><li>Trust shattered.</li><li>And a heavy thought in your head: <em>“This is my fault. I was stupid. Nothing can be done.”</em></li></ul><p><strong>This article exists to push back against that thought.</strong></p><p>The <a href="https://phishdestroy.github.io/DestroyScammers/">DestroyScammers Dashboard</a> was created to document scam infrastructure and real cases. The <a href="https://github.com/phishdestroy/destroylist">DestroyList</a> phishing dataset tracks thousands of malicious domains. There is also a short, action-focused <a href="https://phishdestroy.io/critical-action">guide for victims here</a>.</p><p><strong>Crucially, this dashboard is built entirely via automated data collection from our open-source base: </strong><a href="https://github.com/phishdestroy/destroylist"><strong>https://github.com/phishdestroy/destroylist</strong></a></p><p><strong>It proves you don’t need the FBI — they have their own priorities. You just need to refuse to despair and add a drop of anger. In reality, identifying the “mouse” behind the screen is often easier than finding a special agent who has time for your case.</strong></p><p>All of this has one purpose: to show that victims are not as powerless as scammers want them to believe — and that these “operators” are far less professional and far more exposed than they pretend.</p><p>You may not get a perfect ending. But you are <strong>not</strong> stupid, you are <strong>not</strong> alone, and you are <strong>not</strong> without options.</p><h3>Scammers Are Not “Elite Hackers”</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*nkyjZ-NtU_GfCmJ1" /><figcaption>Most “operators” aren’t elite hackers — just people running Telegram panels and stolen code from a messy desk.</figcaption></figure><p>Scammers work hard to build a specific image: mysterious, untouchable, operating from “dangerous” countries, supposedly protected by their government or by “connections”.</p><p><strong>In reality, most of them are the opposite.</strong></p><p>They use recycled phishing kits, cheap domains, the same hosting over and over, and sloppy communication habits that leak information. They are not strategic assets. They don’t pay taxes. They are not important to their country.</p><p>When real pressure appears — when a case is opened, evidence is collected, and the right jurisdiction gets involved — they look less like “hackers” and more like what they really are: people who thought no one would ever push back.</p><p>One of them literally begged when he realised that his situation was real. That is the true level of “invincibility” behind many of these personas.</p><p>The <a href="https://github.com/phishdestroy/DestroyScammers"><strong>DestroyScammers Dashboard</strong></a> is not a magic weapon. It is a demonstration:</p><blockquote><em>With basic tools, patience and structure, scammers’ trails are visible. They are not ghosts. They are just thieves.</em></blockquote><h3>Two Real Cases: When Victims Didn’t Give Up</h3><p>These aren’t fictional stories. They are real incidents from the same ecosystem of scams and investigations — different circumstances, same core lesson: <strong>evidence + persistence can hurt scammers far more than they expect.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*kAakngNCd0ni_jFN" /><figcaption>From the US to Dubai and Kazakhstan to Russia: when evidence starts moving, scammers discover borders don’t protect them.</figcaption></figure><h3>Case 1: A Remote Scam, Resolved Through Dubai</h3><p>An older man in the US was going through a difficult period in his life. During that time, scammers approached him with a “2× airdrop” offer, supposedly linked to a media personality.</p><p>They didn’t rush. In long “support” chats they:</p><ul><li>Answered questions.</li><li>Walked him through moving funds into Coinbase.</li><li>Convinced him to send his entire balance.</li><li>And then guided him to top up from his bank.</li></ul><p>By the end, they had taken <strong>everything</strong>: a six-figure sum, including money tied to his home.</p><p>He felt crushed. He believed he had failed his grandchildren. He went repeatedly to local police. He called himself a fool for being “tricked like a child”.</p><p>For his son, this became more than a financial loss. It became a matter of principle: <strong>find the person who did this.</strong></p><p>The scammers were not careful. Among other details, they slipped with keyboard layout in chats — small technical hints that contributed to identifying them and linking the activity back to Russia. At one point, the son considered travelling there to push the case. Instead, the family watched the scammer’s social media.</p><p>Then a critical moment appeared: the scammer publicly showed he was <strong>flying to Dubai</strong>.</p><p>The son had a legitimate, work-related legal status in the UAE. That opened a door:</p><ol><li>He filed a formal complaint through local digital channels available to residents.</li><li>He travelled to Dubai.</li><li>He found a lawyer prepared to handle a case against a foreign scammer.</li></ol><p>By the time the scammer landed, the complaint was already there.</p><p><strong>The result was simple:</strong> the complaint was accepted, the scammer was detained on entry, and the case proceeded under UAE law.</p><p>The scam itself did <em>not</em> happen in Dubai. But the resolution did — because one family refused to give up and used jurisdiction against the scammer’s own travel plans.</p><h3>Case 2: A US Victim and a Kazakh Case</h3><p>In another case, a US victim was scammed by a Russian operator.</p><p>Instead of assuming “nothing can be done”, the victim officially transferred their case to a person in <strong>Kazakhstan</strong> — a country with strong legal cooperation in criminal matters.</p><p>The steps were straightforward:</p><ol><li>A criminal case was opened in Kazakhstan.</li><li>A request for legal assistance was sent to Russia.</li><li>Russian authorities executed a search and arrest.</li><li>Russia had its own reasons to keep the scammer; no extradition was needed.</li></ol><p><strong>The outcome:</strong> the victim received their money back, and the scammer received <strong>no protection</strong> from his country.</p><p>This is the opposite of what many scammers say online:</p><blockquote>“If I steal from foreigners and stay in the right country, nothing will ever touch me.”</blockquote><p>Reality: when a case is documented, pushed and backed by evidence, <strong>those stories fall apart</strong>.</p><h3>Borders, Myths and How They Actually Work</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*L3eo9m0vouY6x_hA" /><figcaption>Crypto doesn’t care about countries — and justice doesn’t have borders either.</figcaption></figure><p>Many scammers comfort themselves with myths:</p><ul><li><em>“My country will protect me if I target foreigners.”</em></li><li><em>“Crypto is anonymous; they can’t prove it’s me.”</em></li><li><em>“If I wait long enough, the crime disappears.”</em></li></ul><p>But Russia and multiple other states have legal cooperation with a long list of countries, including CIS/Minsk Convention states and partners like UAE, Türkiye, China, India and others. Requests can lead to searches, interrogations, asset freezes, and arrests.</p><p>Crypto is not a magic cloak. Transactions are traceable. Exchanges keep records. Infrastructure reuse creates patterns. Time is not a safe blanket if your case is active somewhere in the system.</p><p>The goal here is not to promise that every scammer will be arrested. The goal is to show that the world is <strong>less closed</strong> than scammers want you to think.</p><h3>A Note About Russia: Scammers Are More Exposed Than They Think</h3><p>The <strong>DestroyScammers Dashboard</strong> is a minimal baseline. It shows what can be done with open tools and patience. In practice, especially in Russia, many scammers are far more exposed than they realise.</p><p>There is a grey market around so-called “lookup” or <em>probiv</em> services that claim to pull detailed personal records: phone histories, border crossings, registry data and more. Ads openly offer:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*B5JIAcykh2H6Sq8r" /><figcaption><strong>Visualisation of how state-level restrictions are sold as commodities on the grey market.</strong></figcaption></figure><ul><li>Searches through border-control systems.</li><li>Passenger lists and travel bans.</li><li>Civil registry information about relatives, marriages, children.</li><li>Data that clearly does <strong>not</strong> come from any public OSINT source.</li></ul><p><em>I am </em><strong><em>not</em></strong><em> endorsing these services. I do </em><strong><em>not</em></strong><em> use them, I do </em><strong><em>not</em></strong><em> recommend them, and I will not tell anyone how to find or operate them. Their legality is questionable at best. But the fact that this market exists says something important.</em></p><p>Scammers like to pose as ghosts hiding behind nicknames and wallets. In reality, their names, addresses, documents, movements and family ties sit in centralised systems that someone inside is willing to monetize.</p><p><strong>Here is an anonymised example of such a “lookup” report</strong> (shared with consent and translated into English) so you can see the density of data for yourself:</p><p><a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1fEYdjG_T0oAgy9-LrWeTRnGRqta-IZOn/preview">📄 <strong>View the Sample Report (PDF)</strong></a></p><p>If a stranger can allegedly buy that level of detail for the price of a pizza, imagine how little real anonymity a scammer has once a formal case and real pressure appear.</p><blockquote><em>If your goal is not only to recover funds but also to hold a scammer accountable, Russia is one of the places where identity is </em><strong><em>much easier to pierce</em></strong><em> than scammers pretend.</em></blockquote><h3>What DestroyScammers Actually Does</h3><p>The dashboard uses legal tools and paid OSINT services to collect artefacts tied to scam activity. It focuses on actors who have been contacted and warned, showing patterns rather than isolated incidents.</p><p>It does <strong>not</strong> act as law enforcement. It does <strong>not</strong> sell “recovery services”. It does <strong>not</strong> guarantee results.</p><p><strong>What it CAN do is:</strong></p><ol><li>Preserve evidence of scam infrastructure over time.</li><li>Prove that scammers are not invisible.</li><li>Give victims, journalists and investigators a clearer picture of how these operations really function.</li></ol><p>If you want to see it yourself:</p><ul><li><strong>Dashboard:</strong> <a href="https://phishdestroy.github.io/DestroyScammers/">phishdestroy.github.io/DestroyScammers</a></li><li><strong>Dataset:</strong> <a href="https://github.com/phishdestroy/destroylist">github.com/phishdestroy/destroylist</a></li></ul><h3>How We Collect Data (And What We Plan Next)</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GavAWOB8fHCHGOLaLS9Sug.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://phishdestroy.github.io/DestroyScammers/">https://phishdestroy.github.io/DestroyScammers/</a></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://github.com/phishdestroy/DestroyScammers">dashboard </a>and <a href="https://github.com/phishdestroy/destroylist">DestroyList </a>are built on very boring, very legal things: logs from real interactions with scammers plus standard OSINT sources.</p><p>No “hacks”, no access to closed systems, no magic buttons.</p><p><strong>In practice, this means:</strong></p><ul><li>Domains and WHOIS history.</li><li>Certificate transparency logs and passive DNS.</li><li>Public sandbox results (for example, urlscan-type reports).</li><li>Threat feeds and open blocklists.</li><li>Archived copies of sites and panels.</li><li>On-chain traces around known scam wallets.</li></ul><p>For most victims and researchers, the simplest version of this is enough: save screenshots, save HTML, export chats, and run suspicious links through public scanners and archive services. You do not need to break into anything to collect useful evidence.</p><p>We have already used this stack to show that many “projects” are not isolated scammers but small teams: they reuse the same domains, panels, wallets and even social accounts across different schemes. Some of these crews are already visualised on the dashboard; others are in work-in-progress notes.</p><p><strong>The next steps are clear:</strong></p><ul><li>Build case pages for specific scam crews, with timelines, infrastructure maps and on-chain flows.</li><li>Automate more correlation between domains, wallets and social identities.</li><li>Make it easier for victims and professionals to submit evidence so it can be checked and, if it holds up, added to the public picture.</li></ul><p>The goal is not to turn this into a private intelligence service. The goal is to keep pushing a simple idea: scammers are not invisible, and even a modest amount of structured data is enough to show who is behind the buttons they click.</p><h3>If You’re a Victim: A Practical Checklist</h3><p>You do not need to become an investigator. But there are concrete steps that dramatically increase your chances.</p><p><em>(Full guide available here: </em><a href="https://phishdestroy.io/critical-action"><em>phishdestroy.io/critical-action</em></a><em>)</em></p><h3>1. File an Official Report</h3><p>It might feel pointless. It might feel embarrassing. <strong>Do it anyway.</strong> Go to the police. Explain what happened. Ask for a <strong>case number</strong> and written confirmation. Without this, in many systems, your case simply does not exist.</p><h3>2. Save Everything</h3><p>Do <strong>not</strong> delete chats or emails out of shame. Your “stupidity” is not the story here — <strong>their crime is</strong>. Save URLs, transaction hashes, screenshots, chat logs, and email headers. You are assembling a package that someone, somewhere, may later be able to act on.</p><h3>3. ⚠️ Do Not Pay “Recovery” Scammers</h3><p>After a scam, you are a perfect target for secondary predators. If someone tells you:</p><ul><li><em>“We work with banks and can get your funds back.”</em></li><li><em>“We guarantee recovery for a fee.”</em></li><li><em>“We have special methods.”</em></li></ul><p>Assume <strong>they are lying</strong>. Real law enforcement does not cold-contact victims with miracle promises.</p><h3>4. Stay Involved</h3><p>Check on your case number regularly. Ask for written responses. Consult a lawyer with fraud experience. The idea is to keep your case <strong>alive</strong>, documented and ready to be used if an opportunity appears.</p><h3>5. Be Realistic — But Not Hopeless</h3><p>No one honest can promise you a perfect ending. But based on real cases, it is fair to say:</p><p>&gt; With a real police report, preserved evidence and an active, informed victim,<br>&gt; your chances are much better than zero.</p><h4>Sometimes money gets recovered.<br>Sometimes only part of it does.<br>Sometimes the main outcome is that an operator finally faces real consequences.</h4><p>All of those outcomes are better than silence and self-blame.</p><h3>You Are Allowed Not to Give Up</h3><p>Scammers want you to feel ashamed, stupid, isolated and powerless. A silent victim is the perfect victim.</p><p>The truth is different. Smart people get scammed. Experienced people get scammed. You were targeted because they thought you were exploitable in that moment. That says more about <strong>them</strong> than it does about you.</p><p>You are allowed to be angry. You are allowed to want consequences. And you are allowed to try again — this time, <strong>on your terms</strong>, with evidence, structure, and a refusal to let anyone turn your pain into easy profit a second time.</p><p>Silence is what keeps their world safe. Breaking it is where yours starts to recover.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c72add5971a5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Profit Over Players: The BlockBlasters Cover-Up (Steam Scandals, Part 1)]]></title>
            <link>https://phishdestroy.medium.com/profit-over-players-the-blockblasters-cover-up-steam-scandals-part-1-9e9befd3ad2e?source=rss-98b99bd0b2cb------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9e9befd3ad2e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[gaming]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[steam]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[corruption]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investigation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[PhishDestroy]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 18 Oct 2025 14:53:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-10-18T14:53:49.752Z</atom:updated>
            <cc:license>https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/</cc:license>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote><em>We are launching a multi-part investigation uncovering the hidden truth about Steam — revealing the corruption behind its operations, the systemic abuse, exploitation, and negligence that have harmed millions of users, and exposing how a global monopoly turned a gaming platform into a machine of manipulation and silent profit.</em></blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OCjAXr49Z3TFvA2-tvJ3-g.png" /><figcaption>Steam blatantly lies, covers up for criminals, and obstructs the investigation.</figcaption></figure><h3>Introduction: A Crime of Calculated Negligence</h3><p>In August 2025, the world’s largest gaming platform, Steam, didn’t just suffer a security breach; it actively enabled one. Through a cascade of systemic failures and gross negligence, Valve allowed the game <strong>BlockBlasters (AppID 3872350)</strong> to become a Trojan horse for a devastating malware campaign. This wasn’t a sophisticated, unavoidable attack. It was a textbook data-stealing operation that succeeded because Steam’s security is fundamentally broken. For 22 days, it stole hundreds of thousands of dollars, emptied crypto wallets, and compromised user accounts while Valve did nothing.</p><p>When the truth surfaced, Valve’s response was not to protect its users, but to protect its image. The company issued a single, deceitful statement blaming a “compromised developer account” — a pathetic lie designed to shift blame and shield itself from liability. This article will dismantle that lie. Using forensic data, timeline analysis, and Valve’s own policies, we will prove that this incident was not just a failure to act, but a deliberate cover-up of criminal negligence.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*cjhQ2iRqd4T4WTrtD2grHA.png" /><figcaption>Steem blatantly lies and hides Valentin Lopes</figcaption></figure><h3>The 22-Day Timeline of Inaction</h3><p>Valve had 22 days to stop this. User reports were flowing in, and platform data showed clear signs of trouble. Their silence was a choice.</p><ul><li><strong>July 31, 2025</strong> — BlockBlasters launches. A clean, legitimate build is approved by Steam’s vetting process.</li><li><strong>August 30, 2025</strong> — The trap is set. The attackers push <strong>Patch Build 19799326</strong>. This update, containing the malware payload, is approved by Steam and distributed to all players.</li><li><strong>Early September 2025</strong> — The first victims sound the alarm. Users flood Steam Support with tickets reporting anomalous CPU usage, suspicious network traffic, and — most critically — stolen cryptocurrency. These tickets enter a black hole, ignored by Valve.</li><li><strong>September 6–12, 2025</strong> — The data screams a warning. Public SteamDB telemetry shows the player count collapsing to single digits, yet the game remains installed on hundreds of machines, silently exfiltrating data. This massive discrepancy is a red flag that any competent monitoring system should have caught.</li><li><strong>September 21, 2025</strong> — The community acts. Independent security researchers expose the malware’s Telegram-based command-and-control infrastructure, forcing the hackers’ hand.</li><li><strong>September 22, 2025</strong> — The proof is undeniable. G DATA CyberDefense AG publishes a full forensic report, confirming the malware’s multi-stage attack vector and exposing the technical details of the breach.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*gBb55TZXLOOv5xoB.jpg" /></figure><h3>The Anatomy of the Attack</h3><p>This wasn’t cutting-edge malware. It was a crude but effective cocktail of common scripts and stealers that should have been trivial for a multi-billion dollar platform to detect.</p><h4>Stage 1: Initial Compromise (game2.bat)</h4><p>The initial payload, a simple batch script, performed basic reconnaissance: collecting IP, geolocation, and Steam user details. It then downloaded a password-protected ZIP file (v1.zip)—a classic technique to bypass naive automated scanners.</p><h4>Stage 2: Evasion and Escalation (VBS Loaders)</h4><p>Using VBS scripts, the malware executed its core components in hidden command windows. It added its own directory to the Microsoft Defender exclusion list — an action that should trigger an immediate, high-priority alert on any monitored system.</p><h4>Stage 3: Data Theft (Client-built2.exe &amp; Block1.exe)</h4><p>With defenses disabled, the malware deployed its primary payloads: a Python-based backdoor for persistent access and a variant of the <strong>StealC</strong> infostealer. It targeted browser data, session tokens, and, most importantly, cryptocurrency wallets from Chrome, Edge, and Brave. All stolen data was funneled to two command-and-control servers in unsecured HTTP traffic.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Z9HtDZfhleb9UzqplSoMow.png" /><figcaption>It was precisely their trusted certificate and disregard that led to dozens of thefts that they cover up.</figcaption></figure><h3>Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)</h3><p><strong>FileSHA256Classification</strong></p><p>game2.bat</p><p>aa1a1328e0d0042d071bca13ff9a13116d8f3cf77e6e9769293e2b144c9b73b3</p><p>BAT.Trojan-Stealer.StimBlaster.F</p><p>launch1.vbs</p><p>c3404f768f436924e954e48d35c27a9d44c02b7a346096929a1b26a1693b20b3</p><p>Script.Malware.BatchRunner.A@ioc</p><p>test.vbs</p><p>b2f84d595e8abf3b7aa744c737cacc2cc34c9afd6e7167e55369161bc5372a9b</p><p>Script.Malware.BatchRunner.A@ioc</p><p>Client-built2.exe</p><p>17c3d4c216b2cde74b143bfc2f0c73279f2a007f627e3a764036baf272b4971a</p><p>Win64.Backdoor.StimBlaster.L6WGC3</p><p>Block1.exe</p><p>59f80ca5386ed29eda3efb01a92fa31fb7b73168e84456ac06f88fdb4cd82e9e</p><p>Win32.Trojan-Stealer.StealC.RSZPXF</p><h3>Deconstructing the Lie: The “Hacked Account” Is Complete Bullshit</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1020/1*E0HWU2Zaqo-jg9npewFedw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Steam lies and helps victims, while their company checks developers and gives the highest certificate of trust to their content.</figcaption></figure><p>Let’s call Valve’s “hacked developer” excuse what it is: a pathetic and easily disproven lie. It’s an insult to the intelligence of their user base, a narrative crafted to shield them from the consequences of their own negligence. This entire fantasy collapses the moment you look at Steam’s own mandatory procedures.</p><ol><li><strong>The $100 Wall and Identity Verification:</strong> To publish on Steam, every developer must go through the Steam Direct program. This involves paying a <strong>$100 fee</strong> and completing a <strong>Know Your Customer (KYC)</strong> process, providing legal names, banking information, and tax documents. The perpetrator was not an anonymous ghost; Valve had their verified identity and financial details on file. This makes their inaction a conscious choice to protect a verified partner over their own users.</li><li><strong>The 22-Day Blackout Myth:</strong> Steamworks provides developers with robust tools to secure their accounts. A legitimate developer who lost control could file a “lost access to publisher credentials” <a href="https://help.steampowered.com/en/wizard/HelpWithPublishing?issueid=923">ticket</a>. This process is designed to be fast, freezing publishing rights and builds within hours, not weeks. The idea that a developer could be locked out for <a href="https://store.steampowered.com/stats/support/?l=english"><strong>over 20 days</strong></a> while their game distributes malware is absurd. It implies one of two scenarios, both of which indict Valve: either the developer was complicit, or Valve ignored their frantic support tickets <em>in addition to</em> the dozens of user complaints.</li><li><strong>Systematic Neglect of User Complaints:</strong> Dozens of users filed detailed reports of financial theft, malware behavior, and account compromise. These weren’t vague complaints; they were actionable intelligence. A competent support system would have flagged these, escalated the issue, and frozen the app page pending investigation within 24 hours. Valve’s failure to do so for 22 days is not an oversight; it’s a policy of willful ignorance.</li></ol><h3>The Core Deception: Tampering with a Digital Crime Scene</h3><p>This is where Valve’s cover-up graduates from simple negligence to what can only be described as <strong>tampering with a digital crime scene.</strong> Let this be stated without ambiguity: <strong>Valve did not remove the infected game.</strong></p><p>Forensic evidence and analysis from security researchers tracking the C2 infrastructure confirm it unequivocally: <strong>the criminals themselves deleted their malicious builds from Steam’s servers.</strong> They did this on September 21st, only after their Telegram control group was publicly exposed. They executed a “scorched earth” exit, destroying the evidence to cover their tracks.</p><p>Valve’s claim of taking action is a blatant fabrication. By waiting for the attackers to erase their own tracks before stepping in to remove the store page, Valve effectively allowed the primary evidence to be destroyed. This wasn’t damage control; it was obstruction. They weren’t protecting users; they were protecting themselves by ensuring the crime scene was clean.</p><h3>The Human Cost of Corporate Indifference</h3><p>Valve’s negligence had real-world consequences for which it has taken zero responsibility.</p><ul><li><strong>Financial Ruin:</strong> Over <strong>$150,000 USD</strong> was stolen(<strong>looks like more then 1 000 000 USD</strong>)For many, this was life-altering money. One streamer lost <strong>$32,000</strong> during a live charity broadcast for cancer treatment.</li><li><strong>Betrayal of Trust:</strong> Hundreds of users had their accounts compromised, their data stolen, and their systems infected.</li><li><strong>Absolute Silence:</strong> To this day, Valve has offered <strong>no refunds, no compensation, and no genuine apology</strong>. Their form-letter response was an insult to every victim.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*unbJkIpJcIZTGOZqTCrgLw.png" /></figure><h3>The Motive: Profit Over People</h3><p>Why would Valve allow this to happen? The motive is as simple as it is cynical: <strong>it was cheaper.</strong></p><p>A real security overhaul — implementing sandboxed testing for all builds, separating developer credentials, hiring a competent security team, and publishing transparency reports — would cost millions. Paying restitution to victims would set a costly precedent.</p><p>The alternative? Issue a vague, misleading statement, let the news cycle move on, and absorb the minimal PR hit. It was a calculated business decision where user safety was deemed an acceptable loss.</p><p>This pattern of negligence is not new. From <strong>PirateFi (2024)</strong> to <strong>Chemia (2025)</strong>, Valve has repeatedly ignored warnings and allowed malware onto its platform, only acting after public outcry. BlockBlasters was not an anomaly; it was the inevitable result of a rotten security culture.</p><h3>Final Verdict: Guilty as Charged</h3><p>Let the facts speak for themselves.</p><ul><li><strong>Fact:</strong> Valve’s automated systems approved a build containing trivial malware.</li><li><strong>Fact:</strong> Valve’s support team ignored direct warnings from victims for three weeks.</li><li><strong>Fact:</strong> Valve only acted <em>after</em> the hackers themselves removed the malicious files.</li><li><strong>Fact:</strong> Valve’s official statement was a deliberate misrepresentation of events designed to avoid accountability.</li></ul><p>Valve didn’t just fail. <strong>It lied.</strong> It covered up its own negligence, protected its profits, and left its users to pay the price. The trust that the community placed in Steam has been irrevocably broken. This wasn’t a mistake; it was a betrayal.</p><h3>Sources</h3><ul><li><a href="https://www.google.com/search?q=G+DATA+CyberDefense+AG+BlockBlasters+report">G DATA CyberDefense AG (Sept 22, 2025)</a></li><li><a href="https://steamdb.info/">SteamDB</a></li><li><a href="https://gamalytic.com/">Gamalytic</a></li><li><a href="https://www.gamesradar.com/">GamesRadar</a></li><li><a href="https://www.theverge.com/">The Verge</a></li><li><a href="https://www.tomshardware.com/">Tom’s Hardware</a></li><li><a href="https://www.google.com/search?q=BlockBlasters+Steam+malware+community+incident+logs">Community incident logs</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9e9befd3ad2e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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